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I.

Introduction

The 2011 dispute between the National Football League (“NFL” or “League”),
representing the football teams, and NFL Players’ Association (“NFLPA,” or “Players”
or “Players Association”), the union representing its football players, oscillated among
the collective bargaining table, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), and the
courts. The League preferred labor law as the matrix of the controversy. The Players
preferred antitrust law. Ultimately, the union’s most powerful weapon was not with
withholding player services in a strike, but to challenge various anti-competitive
arrangements wanted by the teams under the antitrust laws.
The 2011 litigation muted the players’ option to choose between collective bargaining
and antitrust litigation, making it somewhat less likely that players will alternate
between choosing a union as their representative and then disclaiming it. It makes it
clear that the labor exemption to the antitrust laws runs more broadly than the
narrowest definition of collective bargaining. It also, considering the sides taken by the
teams and the players, signals that there is something about the economic structure of
product and labor markets in professional sports—and perhaps entertainment
industries more generally2—that radically differs from the structure of product and
labor markets in other industries.3
The controversy was widely publicized and undoubtedly drew more public attention
than any labor-management dispute in recent years. Its notoriety provides an
opportunity to review the relationship between federal labor and antitrust law, and
more generally to consider how competition law should operate in the entertainment
industry, which is characterized by many anti-competitive arrangements and pressure
to manage new types of competition arising from a technological revolution.

See generally Harold L. Vogel, Entertainment Industry Economics: A Guide for Financial Analysis at 2230 (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter "Vogel"] (comparing movies, television, music, broadcasting, cable
television, publishing, the Internet, games, gambling, sports, performing arts, and amusement parts as
divisions of the entertainment industry).
2

See Paul D. Staudohar, Playing for Dollars: Labor Relations and the Sports Business at 6 (1996)
[hereinafter “Playing for Dollars”] (asserting that professional sports is part of the entertainment
industry and that its industrial relations systems resemble those of other segments of entertainment
industry).
3
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"Current sports antitrust doctrine is muddled, confusing, and often incoherent . . . ."4 In
other words, the law regulating entertainment labor markets is an ass: 5 it privileges
anti-competitive structures in professional and college football; it leaves college athletes
wholly without protection; and it is irrelevant in the lower tiers of theatre and
moviemaking. The significance of the NFL lockout is not that it drew some crisp new
line defining a boundary of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. Rather the lesson
it teaches is that, when the law is healthy, it accommodates itself to realities of the
marketplace. Hopefully that will prove to be the case in the other entertainment
industries as well. This article is intended to contribute to that accommodative outlook.
Collective bargaining, and hence the labor exemption, is of small and diminishing
importance as the revolution in major parts of the entertainment industry gains
momentum. In theatre and movie production workers must seek protection politically
and through the minimum-wage laws, while producers seek legitimate—and
illegitimate—limits on competition under the antitrust rule of reason. Ultimately,
market forces, changing with technological advances, will dominate, not law.
It is widely accepted that antitrust law regulates product markets, while labor law6
regulates labor markets.7 The boundary between the two is the boundary of the labor
exemption to the antitrust laws. That boundary is, however, inherently artificial. 8
Successful collective bargaining and compliance with other labor law increases labor

Kreher, 6 Va. Sports & Ent. L. J. at 54 (advocating different insights and different rules for sports
industry).
4

“If the law believes that, the law is an ass . . . .” North American Soccer League v. National Football
League, 505 F.Supp. 659, 659 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist; and rejecting
antitrust challenge to NFL rules prohibiting teams owners from owning teams in competing leagues),
aff'd and rev'd on other grounds, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that ban on ownership of teams in
competing leagues violated Sherman Act under rule of reason analysis).
5

Labor law is not just the law of collective bargaining, but also includes minimum
wage and maximum-hour law, worker's compensation law, and unemployment
compensation law.
6

See Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 Stanford L. Rev. 991, 992-995 (1986) [hereinafter
"Campbell"].
7

8

8

Campbell 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 993.

costs, and this reduces output and or increases prices in product markets.9 Unionized
employers will be driven out of business by non-union competitors unless collective
bargaining is accompanied by some kind of product-market restraints. Labor market
restraints can be identical to product market restraints prohibited by the antitrust
laws,10 or collateral regulation of product market competition can be indirect and subtle.
In any event, "Without economic refinement, rewards obtained from effect on the
product market and those obtained from effect on the labor market are inextricable." 11
The literature about the labor exemption – and on collective bargaining in general –
assumes that the question is how to increase the welfare of workers without damaging
the product market too much. In the context of this article, the question is different: it
considers how to adapt the antitrust laws to a socially beneficial revolution that mainly
affects product markets and increased consumer welfare. The revolution contracts the
boundary between labor markets and product markets and also makes the boundary
less distinct.
In professional sports the interesting conflicts are at the top. In the other entertainment
industries the interesting conflicts are at the bottom. The technological revolution is
leading to disintermediation and fragmentation of production and consumption. That
means that the firms and players at the top are threatened by those at the bottom.
This article describes those revolutionary phenomena and explains why the boundaries
of the labor exemptions are particularly difficult to define in the entertainment
industries, including professional sports. It also predicts that controversies over the
scope of the labor exemptions and broader controversies over the application of
antitrust law will become more frequent as technology enables employers to push more
work beyond the boundaries of conventional firms and opens up new revenue
opportunities for employers and some employees. Technology’s tendency to blur the
boundaries separating employment from entrepreneurship also will strain the line
separating labor from product markets.
The effect will be to push more controversies about the legality of relevant action from
the relatively certain territory of traditional interpretations of the labor exemptions into

9

Campbell, 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 997.

10

Campbell, 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 999 (characterizing insights of Archibald Cox).

11

Campbell, 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 998.
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less familiar territory, testing the boundaries of the exemptions and necessitating
balancing of anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects under antitrust law’s rule of
reason.
This article begins with a brief review of the NFL lockout litigation. Then it analyzes the
special features of entertainment product and labor markets and recapitulates basic
antitrust and labor-law concepts and their application to specific restrictions on
competition common in entertainment markets. It argues that over-aggressive
definition and enforcement of copyright is probably the greatest threat to realization of
the fruits of new technologies in the entertainment field. Copyright provides an anticompetitive beachhead for extending anticompetitive mechanisms at least as strong as
collective bargaining.12
Finally it explores technology’s revolution in major parts of the industry, and explains
how there is hope for the future. The technological revolution – not the present one but
the previous one – has already changed the landscape of NFL economics, shifting the
most relevant revenue stream to television broadcast revenues. This is a foreshadowing
of what's beginning to happen in the rest of the entertainment industry
Defining the boundaries of the “entertainment industry” is challenging. To make the
analysis manageable, the article focuses on professional football—the NFL—as
representative of professional sports more generally, occasionally also noting relevant
developments in other sports. Professional football produced the recent litigation that
invited the inquiry. It uses popular music, including rock and country, as the exemplar
for music, saving symphony orchestras and dance bands for someone else or another
time. It ranges more broadly with respect to theatre and movies, including the spectrum
from Broadway plays to storefront community theatre, and the spectrum from
Hollywood blockbuster to narrative YouTube videos. The broader scope for scripted
entertainment is warranted because it is here where the impact of the technological

See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New architectures for music: Law Should Get Out of the Way, 29
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 259 (2007); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Flanking the DRM Maginot Line Against
New Music Markets, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L LAW 113 (2007); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Music Markets and
Mythologies, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 831 (2010); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business Models
for Music, 18 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 63 (2010); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cut in Tiny Pieces: Ensuring
12

that Fragmented Ownership Does Not Chill Creativity, 14 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH.L.1 (2011).
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revolution is most intense. The limited scope for music is warranted because symphony
orchestras and dance bands account for a relatively small part of music consumption,
and they—symphony orchestras, anyway--are organized completely differently from
other parts of the music industry.

II.

Background of the NFL controversy

For the last sixty years, the interplay between labor and antitrust law has shaped
collective bargaining in the professional football industry.
Professional football did not establish a significant presence in the public mind until the
late 1930s.13 The Players Association emerged in the mid 1950s, but the NFL refused to
deal with it until the Association threatened antitrust litigation against the League.14 In
Radovich v. NFL,15 , the Supreme Court held that professional football—unlike major
league baseball16—was not categorically exempt from the antitrust laws. Eleven years

13

Playing for Dollars at 57-58.

14

Playing for Dollars at 65.

15

352 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1957)

In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208209 (1922), the Supreme Court exempted professional baseball from the Sherman Act by concluding that
it did not involve interstate commerce.
16

In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam), the Court adhered to its decision in
Federal Baseball Club, in a very similar baseball case, premised on the baseball industry's reliance on that
decision and Congress's failure to overturn it. 346 U.S. at 79.
In Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), the Supreme Court declined to extend the
baseball exemption beyond baseball, suggesting that Federal Baseball was wrongly decided. 352 U.S. at
452. The Court was unwilling to overrule it, however, because:
"more harm would be done in overruling Federal Base Ball than in upholding a ruling which at best was
of dubious validity. Vast efforts had gone into the development and organization of baseball since that
decision and enormous capital had been invested in reliance on its permanence. Congress had chosen to
make no change. All this, combined with the flood of litigation that would follow its repudiation, the
harassment that would ensue, and the retroactive effect of such a decision, led the Court to the practical
result that it should sustain the unequivocal line of authority reaching over many years." 352 U.S. at 450451.
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later, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recognized the NFL Players
Association (“NFLPA”) as the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL players,
and the NFL and the NFLPA entered into their first collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”).17
In 1972, several players filed an antitrust action against the League in Mackey v. NFL,18
alleging that the League's “Rozelle Rule,” restricting movement of free agents—players
whose contracts with a particular team have expired—violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.
The court concluded that the restriction violated § 1, because it was significantly more
restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes of maintaining competitive
balance in the NFL. While the Mackey litigation was pending, the collective agreement
between the League and the Players Association expired, and seventy-eight NFL
players filed a separate class action antitrust suit against the League. 19 In 1977, the
League and the players entered into a settlement agreement incorporating a new
collective bargaining agreement that implemented a revised system of free agency
known as “right of first refusal/compensation.”20
In December 1982, the Players engaged in a fifty-seven-day strike before agreeing to a
new collective agreement that included a modified version of the “right of first

The Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub.L. 105-297, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2824, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 26b,
partially repealed the baseball exemption to "to state that major league baseball players are covered under
the antitrust laws (i.e., that major league baseball players will have the same rights under the antitrust
laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along with a provision that
makes it clear that the passage of this Act does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any
other context or with respect to any other person or entity." 15 U.S.C. § 26b note (quoting purpose section
of Curt Flood Act).
In United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955), the Supreme Court declined to apply the baseball
exemption to theatrical productions, reasoning that the baseball exemption was limited by a narrow
application of stare decisis,16 the same reasoning applied by the Court two years later to football, in
Radivitch.
17

See Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661 at 663-664 (detailing history).

18

543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir.1976)

See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 282 (8th Cir.1978); Alexander v. NFL, No. 4–76–123, 1977 WL 1497, at
*1 (D.Minn. Aug. 1, 1977).
19

20

12

Brady, 644 F.3d at 664 (detailing history).

refusal/compensation” system. This agreement expired in 1987, and when negotiations
for a new CBA proved unsuccessful, the Players struck again and filed an antitrust suit
in Powell v. NFL,21 alleging among other things that the League's free agency restrictions
violated the Sherman Act. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the nonstatutory
labor exemption applied, pursuant to Mackey.22
Two days after the Powell decision, in November, 1989, the Players Association
abandoned collective bargaining rights in an effort to end the NFL's nonstatutory labor
exemption. The Players Association disclaimed its union status, enacted new bylaws
prohibiting it from engaging in collective bargaining with the League, filed a labor
organization termination notice with the U.S. Department of Labor, obtained a
reclassification by the Internal Revenue Service as a “business league” rather than a
labor organization, and notified the NFL that it would no longer represent players in
grievance proceedings.23
In 1990, eight individual football players brought a new antitrust action against the
League in McNeil v. NFL,24 contending that new player restraints imposed by the
League during the 1990–1991 season violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. On September 10,
1992, following a ten-week trial, a jury found the NFL in violation § 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.25 The individual players then sought injunctive relief to become free
agents for the 1992 season.26 Two new antitrust lawsuits were filed in the two-week
period after the McNeil verdict. Ten NFL players brought suit in Jackson v. NFL,27
alleging that the League's free agency restrictions violated the Sherman Act. Five other

21

678 F.Supp. 777, 780–81 (D.Minn.1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).

22

930 F.2d at 1298.

23

644 F.3d at 664-665.

24

790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).

15 U.S.C. § 1. See McNeil v. Nat'l Football League (Plan B Free Agency), No. 4–90–476, 1992 WL 315292,
at *1 (D.Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
25

See Jackson v. Nat'l Football League, 802 F.Supp. 226, 228 (D.Minn.1992); White v. Nat'l Football
League, 822 F.Supp. 1389 (D.Minn.1993)..
26

27

802 F.Supp. 226, 228–229, 234 n. 14 (D.Minn.1992).
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NFL players instituted White v. NFL,28 a class action alleging that various practices of the
League, including free agency restraints, the college draft, and the use of a standard
NFL player contract, violated the antitrust laws.
In January 1993, the parties reached a tentative agreement to resolve White and related
cases. The Players Association subsequently collected authorization cards from NFL
players redesignating the organization as the players' exclusive collective bargaining
representative, and the NFL voluntarily recognized the NFLPA as the players' union on
March 29, 1993. The district court approved the parties' Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement (“SSA”) in April 1993, and the NFL and the NFLPA entered into a new
collective agreement shortly thereafter, amending the SSA to conform to the provisions
of the new collective agreement. The district court approved the requested
amendments in a consent decree issued on August 20, 1993, retaining jurisdiction to
supervise its implementation. The parties amended and extended the collective
agreement in 1996 and 1998 and 2006.29
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,30 holding that that the
nonstatutory labor exemption applied to employer conduct that occurred during and
immediately after a collective-bargaining negotiation, when it involved a mandatory
subject of bargaining that grew out of the bargaining process.
After 1993, the Players and the League operated under the White SSA, and the district
court continued to oversee the settlement by resolving numerous disputes over the
terms of the SSA and CBA. Whenever the NFL and the Players Association agreed to
change a provision in the collective agreement, a conforming change was also made to
the SSA. The SSA was thus amended several times, most recently in 2006, when the
NFL and the NFLPA adopted new collective agreement, which ran through the 2012–
2013 football season. Either side could opt out of the final two years of the agreement
upon written notice.

28

822 F.Supp. 1389, 1395 (D.Minn.1993).

White v. National Football League, 766 F. Supp.2d 941, 944 (D. Minn. 2011) (describing history of SSA
and collective bargaining agreement); 644 F.3d at 665 (detailing history).
29

30

518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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In May 2008, the NFL opted out of the final two years of the SSA and CBA, citing
concerns about operating costs and other elements of the agreements.31
A major issue in the 2011 dispute was the teams’ demand that the players reduce their
share of television revenues.32 Approximately half of NFL revenues come from
broadcast contracts with the networks.33 Sharing television revenues is a mandatory
subject of bargaining under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. 34 The
League and the Players Association negotiated for two years over a new agreement to
take effect in March 2011 after the existing agreement expired. As a result, the SSA and
CBA were scheduled to expire in early March 2011. Although the NFL and the NFLPA
engaged in more than two years of negotiations, they were unable to reach an
agreement. The League filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB in February
2011, asserting that the union failed to confer in good faith.35
As the deadline approached, the players voted to end the Players Association status as
their collective bargaining representative. On March 11, 2011—the expiration date of the
SSA and CBA—the Players Association notified the NFL that it disclaimed interest in
continuing to serve as the players' collective bargaining representative, effective at 4:00
p.m. The Players Association also amended its bylaws to prohibit collective bargaining
with the League or its agents, filed a labor organization termination notice with the
Department of Labor, asked the Internal Revenue Service to reclassify the NFLPA as a

31

644 F.3d at 666-667 (detailing history).

See Clay Moorhead, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in the NFL: Perfecting the Balanace Between
NFL Socialism and Unrestrained Free-Trade, 8 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 641, 678 (2006) [hereinafter
"Moorhead"] (reporting on early negotiation stances: players want 64% of total revenues; owners refuse to
relinquish more than 57%).
32

White v. National Football League, 766 F. Supp.2d 941, 945 (D. Minn. 2011); "The NFL’s national media
revenue is the backbone of the business." Jake I. Fisher, The NFL's Current Business Model and the
Potential 2011 Lockout 4 (May 4, 2010), http://harvardsportsanalysis.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/the-nflbusiness-model-and-potential-lockout.pdf [hereinafter "Fisher paper"]. For example, the Green Bay
Packers earned 38% of its revenue in 2009 from TV and radio broadcasting, 15% from merch sales and
licensing and endorsements, and only 20% from ticket sales. Fisher Paper at 21.
33

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, 531 F.Supp. 578, 607
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that share of pay television revenues was a form of profit sharing and therefore a
mandatory subject of bargaining).
34

35

644 F.3d at 666-667.
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professional association rather than a labor organization, and notified the NFL that it
would no longer represent players bringing grievances against the League.
The League filed an amended unfair labor practice charge on March 11, alleging that the
NFLPA's disclaimer was a “sham” and that the combination of a disclaimer by the
union and subsequent antitrust litigation was “a ploy and an unlawful subversion of
the collective bargaining process.”
Individual players, funded by the Players Association, filed suit on the same day as the
disclaimer, March 11, 2011, in Brady v. NFL,36 alleging that the anticipated lockout
violated the Sherman Act and that other anticipated league actions, including a
limitation on the amount of compensation that can be paid to recently drafted first-year
“rookie” players, a cap on salaries for current players, and “franchise player” and
“transition player” designations that restrict the ability of free agents to join a team
other than their former team anticompetitive practices similarly violated the Act.37
On March 12, the League instituted a lockout of members of the Players Association
bargaining unit, which included professional football players under contract, free
agents, and prospective players who had been drafted by or entered into negotiations
with an NFL team. The NFL informed players under contract that the lockout would
prohibit them from entering League facilities, from receiving any compensation or
benefits, and from performing any employment duties including playing, practicing,
working out, attending meetings, making promotional appearances, and consulting
medical and training personnel except in limited situations.
On April 25, 2011, the district court granted the Players' motion to enjoin the lockout.
After staying the injunction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the district court of
jurisdiction to issue the injunction.38
On August 4, 2011, the players and the league entered into a new collective bargaining
agreement to run through the end of the 2020 season. 39 It explicitly provided that it

36

644 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 2011) (detailing history).

37

644 F.3d at 667-668.

38

Brady v. NFL, 664 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).

39

Art. 69, sec. 1.
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superseded any conflicting provisions in the Settlement Agreement.40 It committed the
Players Association not to file any suit against the NFL or any team or to give voluntary
testimony in support of any issue covered by the agreement, unless in support of a
claim of a breach of the agreement.41
Paralleling the antitrust litigation, the players challenged a unilateral change in the
arrangements for sharing television revenue with the players. In White v. National
Football League (“the 2011 television decision”),42 the district court held that an
agreement negotiated between the NFL and the television networks violated the White
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ("SSA"), which resolved the 1987 strike and
lockout. The union claimed that an agreement to extend and renegotiate broadcast
contracts with DirecTV, CBS, Fox, NBC, and ESPN violated the NFL's obligation under
the SSA to act in good faith and use best efforts to maximize total revenues for both the
NFL and the Players for each SSA playing season,43 after the NFL opted out of the final
two years of the 2006 collective bargaining agreement and SSA.44 Shortly after that, the
League negotiated extensions of its broadcast contracts to cushion its economic losses in
the event of a strike or lockout.
The district court found that broadcast revenues are "an enormous source of shared
revenue” for the Players and the NFL.45 It concluded that the League violated the SSA
by negotiating with the broadcasters to advance its own interests and harm the interests
of the players. "[U]nder the terms of the SSA, the NFL is not entitled to obtain leverage
by renegotiating shared revenue contracts, during the SSA, to generate post-SSA
leverage and revenue to advance its own interests and harm the interests of the Players.
Here, the NFL renegotiated the broadcast contracts to benefit its exclusive interest at the
expense of, and contrary to, the joint interests of the NFL and the Players. This conduct

40

Art. 2, sec. 1.

41

Art. 3, sec. 2.

42

766 F. Supp.2d 941 (D. Minn. 2011).

43

766 F.Supp.2d at 943 (describing issue and arguments).

The SSA and the collective agreement originated in 1993. The collective agreement was amended and
extended in 1996, 1998, and 2006. 766 F. Supp.2d at 944.
44

45

766 F. Supp.2d at 951.
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constitutes “a design ... to seek an unconscionable advantage” and is inconsistent with
good faith."46
The court ordered a further hearing to determine appropriate relief that was explicitly
to consider both damages and an injunction.47 This lawsuit was settled as part of the
overall resolution of the 2011 dispute.
This decades long conflict represents, not a traditional labor-management controversy,
but a struggle by participants in an entertainment industry to reconcile the procompetitive mandates of the antitrust law with the practical necessity of anticompetitive measures to enhance the attractiveness of the entertainment product. Selfinterest on the part of both service providers (the players) and entrepreneurs (the team
owners) naturally operates, but that is inherent in any market.

III.

Entertainment product and labor markets

The NFL lockout litigation used the labor exemption to protect anti-competitive
mechanisms in the product market. Antitrust law focuses on market realities, not
formalistic distinctions. Accordingly, any antitrust analysis must begin with close
examination of "the economic reality of the market at issue."48 John T. Dunlop’s classic
Industrial Relations Systems emphasizes that industry structure and the
microeconomics of product and labor markets, along with the law, determine the
differing shape of industrial relations systems, including collective bargaining, in
different industries.49 To explore the implications of the NFL controversy throughout
the entertainment industry, one must begin with an analysis of market structure.

46

766 F. Supp.2d at 951.

47

766 F. Supp.2d at 854.

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-467 (1992) (affirming reversal of
summary judgment for defendant in tying and monopolization case after exhaustive exploration of the
dynamics of supply and demand in carefully defined markets for copying equipment and service);
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984)
(agreeing with district court that college football broadcasts constitute separate market).
48

49

See Playing for Dollars at 4-5 (applying Dunlop’s insights to professional sports labor markets).
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A.

Industry structures and labor markets
1.

Corporate structures

In professional sports, associations of teams, usually called leagues, exercise significant
private regulatory power over individual teams. In American Needle, Inc. v. National
Football League,50 however, the Supreme court held that the NFL was not a single
enterprise entitled to the intra-enterprise exemption to the antitrust laws. It provided a
useful summary of the structure of the NFL:
"The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decisionmaking quality or the single
aggregation of economic power characteristic of independent action. Each of the teams
is a substantial, independently owned, and independently managed business. . . . The
teams compete with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans, for
gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing personnel.”51
Baseball and hockey are organized like football. Soccer is different. In Fraser v. Major
League Soccer, L.L.C.,52 the court of appeals reviewed the industry structure for
professional soccer in the United States, in considering a single-entity defense:
"MLS has, to say the least, a unique structure, even for a sports league. MLS retains
significant centralized control over both league and individual team operations. MLS
owns all of the teams that play in the league (a total of 12 prior to the start of 2002), as
well as all intellectual property rights, tickets, supplied equipment, and broadcast
rights. MLS sets the teams' schedules; negotiates all stadium leases and assumes all
related liabilities; pays the salaries of referees and other league personnel; and supplies
certain equipment."53
The controversy involved the league's control over player recruitment. "In a nutshell,
MLS recruits the players, negotiates their salaries, pays them from league funds, and, to
a large extent, determines where each of them will play. For example, to balance talent

50

___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010).

51

130 S.Ct. at 2212-2213.

52

284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002).

53

284 F.3d at 53.
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among teams, it decides, with the non-binding input of team operators, where certain of
the league's “marquee” players will play."54
The league contracts with investors to operate nine of the League's 12 teams. The
operator/investors hire general managers and coaches and may trade players with other
teams, pick players in the League draft, but pay not bid independently for players55
They also must comply with a salary cap.56 A class of players claimed that the
agreement not to compete for player services violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.57
The court rejected the claims on market-definition grounds, but suggested that even
outside the classic single entity situation exemplied by Copperweld, the rule of reason
might show flexibility for for interdependent multi-party enterprises. Sports leagues
are a primary example but so are common franchising arrangements and joint ventures
that perform specific services for competitors.58 It noted Justice Rehnquist's argument
that all sports leagues be treated as single entities because they must collaborate to
produce a product.59
The rest of the entertainment industry is even more decentralized than professional
football. Corporate entities, partnerships or sole proprietorships are the units of
production. Trade associations exist, but exercise no regulatory power outside the
standards-setting and enforcement arena. Collective licensing of copyrights for music is
the notable exception.60
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284 F.3d at 53.
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. 284 F.3d at 54.
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284 F.3d at 54.
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284 F.3d at 54-55.
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284 F.2d at 58.

284 F.3d at 55, citing American Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissending from
denial of certiorari).
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See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cut in Tiny Pieces: Ensuring that Fragmented Ownership Does Not Chill
Creativity, 14 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 1, 64 (2011) (detailing history and operation of copyright
collectives).
60
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2.

Sports and the rest – similarities and differences

Entertainment industry product markets have characteristics that distinguish all of
them from other industry product markets. Each entertainment industry also has
product-market features that distinguish it from other entertainment-industries.
The structure of the markets for professional sports is dramatically different from that
of non-entertainment industries. Ethan Lock identified the following attributes of
product markets in professional football:




No real substitutes exist for the NFL product;
The NFL regulates intra-league competition for fans and players, in the interest
of competitive balance;
The NFL competes with no other football league for either players or fans.61

The peculiar economics of the professional sports industry make application of
antitrust- and labor-law doctrines developed for manufacturing and most service
industries awkward. In most industries each firm seeks to avoid competition. In
professional sports, a team cannot gain fans unless it has credible competition. In most
industries, a firm seeks to extinguish its competitors. In professional sports, a team has
an incentive to build up its competitors; if the competition is too weak, games will not
be interesting, and the audience will fall off. Leagues such as the NFL developed to
management these problems. “Sports leagues are . . . cartels that exist to allocate and
control the [product] and [labor] and to eliminate within the cartel competition over . . .
players and . . . fans.62
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have recognized the
salience of unique product-market features in construing the antitrust laws. In NCAA v.
Board of Regents,63 the Supreme Court held that restrictions by the NCAA on broadcasts
of college football games violated the Sherman Act:
"By participating in an association which prevents member institutions from competing
against each other on the basis of price or kind of television rights that can be offered to

Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 Duke L. J. 339, 354-359
(1989) (explaining uniqueness of employer-employee relationships in professional sports).
61

62

63

Labor Relations in Professional Sports at text accompanying n.10.
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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broadcasters, the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint—an
agreement among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another.
. . . By restraining the quantity of television rights available for sale, the challenged
practices create a limitation on output; our cases have held that such limitations are
unreasonable restraints of trade."64
Nevertheless, it noted the special characteristics of sports:
" Some activities can only be carried out jointly. . . . What the NCAA and its member
institutions market in this case is competition itself—contests between competing
institutions. Of course, this would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on
which the competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed. A
myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the field, the number of players on a
team, and the extent to which physical violence is to be encouraged or proscribed, all
must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in which institutions compete.
Moreover, the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—college football. . .
. In order to preserve the character and quality of the “product,” athletes must not be
paid, must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the “product”
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such
restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon
be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve
its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be
unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice—not only the
choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletes—and hence can be
viewed as procompetitive."65
These pro-competitive tendencies could offset anti-competitive effects in a rule of
reason analysis.66 Finding no pro-competitive effects to offset the anti-competitive
effects of the NCAA rules limiting television broadcasts of games, however, the Court
affirmed the lower courts' finding of a Sherman Act violation.67
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468 U.S. at 99-100.
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468 U.S. at 101-102.
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468 U.S. at 103-104 (distinguishing per-se from rule-of-reason analysis).
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468 U.S. at 120.
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In American Needle,68 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the single-entity theory
might shield certain types of NFL conduct:
"Football teams that need to cooperate are not trapped by antitrust law. “[T]he special
characteristics of this industry may provide a justification” for many kinds of
agreements. The fact that NFL teams share an interest in making the entire league
successful and profitable, and that they must cooperate in the production and
scheduling of games, provides a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of
collective decisions. But the conduct at issue in this case is still concerted activity under
the Sherman Act that is subject to § 1 analysis."69
“We have recognized, for example, that the interest in maintaining a competitive
balance” among “athletic teams is legitimate and important. While that same interest
applies to the teams in the NFL, it does not justify treating them as a single entity for § 1
purposes when it comes to the marketing of the teams' individually owned intellectual
property. It is, however, unquestionably an interest that may well justify a variety of
collective decisions made by the teams."70
Ethan Lock identified the following attributes of the labor market in professional
football:





The value of a player depends not only on skills, but also on the player's attitude,
conduct, age, and relationship with teammates;
Players have limited community of interest;
Players have limited job security and short working lives;
The NFL is the only buyer of player skills, which are not generally transferrable
to other industries.71

Professional sports share most of these characteristics. That baseball is treated
differently from other sports is an anomalous result of the doctrine of stare decisis.72
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___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
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130 S.Ct. at 2216.
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130 S.Ct. at 2217.

Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 Duke L. J. 339, 354-359
(1989) (explaining uniqueness of employer-employee relationships in professional sports).
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Each of these attributes applies to the labor markets in other entertainment industries
such as theatre and movies. Each of them, except the last, applies to the popular music
industry, where there is sharp competition among record labels and other, newer,
intermediaries that link the labor market to the product market. Collective bargaining in
the popular music industry, unlike professional sports, theatre, and movies is of only
marginal importance because most musicians—particularly those performing popular
music are not traditional employees entitled to engage in collective bargaining.
Labor costs are important in all of the entertainment industries. Player payrolls
consumer more than half of total NFL revenue.73 In the movie industry, cast expenses
comprise slightly less than 20% of the budget.74 Broadway's Spiderman reported that
artistic labor costs accounting for 19% of production costs and 33% of running costs.75 In
indie theatre, the percentages are a good bit lower, because personnel often are unpaid.
One study of off-off-Broadwas products concluded that about 16% of the total budget
was for artistic labor.76
Though professional sports and other entertainment industries share some
characteristics, they also differ in important ways. They are similar in that they depend
on celebrity to draw audiences. They are similar in that their production is episodic:
fans consume77 specific performances, games, movies, or musical works. 78

Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying baseball exemption but
noting "dubious" application of stare decisis to preserve it).
72
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Fisher Paper at 21 (reporting 57% in 2008).

See Ralph S. Singleton, Film Budgeting 7, 62 (1996) (detailing cost categories and cast costs for $15
million movie; "cast unit" accounting for 19.67% of total); Deke Simon, Film and Video Budgets 230 (2010)
(budget line items for $5 million feature film; "cast" and "extra talent" categories accouning for 17.98% of
total).
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Letter from Christopher A. Cacace to Elizabeth Block attaching financial statements (June 2, 2011),
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/206114/8-legged-productions-llc-2011-01-02-financial.pdf.
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Statistical Analysis of Off-Off-Broadway Budgets 8 (April 2008),
http://www.nyitawards.com/survey/OOBBudgetStudy.pdf (7% for actors, including productions that did
not pay actors; 4% for designed, including unpaid designers, 5% for director, stage manager, and crew).
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“Consumption” of entertainment includes attending a live event such as a football game, performance
of a play, or music concert, and watching or listening to a game, a movie, or a music recording.
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They are similar in that most players or performers have relatively short careers. They
are similar in that they employ institutional frameworks to aggregate and concentrate
the selection of talent: the draft in professional football, auditions for movies and plays.
In this respect the labor markets are more highly organized than in most other
industries, in which employment decisions occur on a purely ad-hoc basis, involving
individual employees.
Professional sports, theatre, and live music also are similar in that the product is
consumed as it is produced. Football games, plays, and concerts can be recorded of
course, but there is little market for such recordings. Movies and recorded music are
similar in that production and consumption are separated. Capital is invested in
making a studio recording or a movie on speculation, in the hope that consumption will
be sufficient to provide a return on the investment.
In all of the relevant industries, the supply of labor greatly exceeds the demand. Many
more people would like to play professional football than there are slots on teams.79
Many more actors would like to be in movies or stage plays than there are roles in
productions. Many more musicians would like to perform than there are
opportunities—although it is relatively easy for a musician to perform locally at small
venues or at open-mic events. At the same time, professional athletes, actors, and
musicians are not fungible. Each has unique characteristics that make him desirable or
undesirable for a particular role. A football team would not recruit Tim Tebow to play
guard. A casting director would not select Anthony Hopkins to play one of the young
lovers in Brokeback Mountain or Justin Bieber to play a heavy in a gangster movie.
Those distinguishing characteristics, however, are not all objectively measurable. One
can measure the velocity of a quarterback’s pass, the size of his hands and feet,80; and
time how fast he runs the 40-yard dash, but one can only guess at his leadership ability,

The more episodic the delivery of services to the audience, the more likely is independent contractor
status rather than employee status. See § ___ (detailing criteria for distinguishing employees from
independent contractors).
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Each of the 32 teams in the NFL are allowed 53 players on its roster. NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement art. 25 § 4 (Aug. 4, 2011) (limiting total on each team's active and inactive player lists to 53
players); http://www.nfl.com/teams (listing 32 teams comprising NFL).
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See Thomas Jackson, QB's Hands: does Size really matter...?, http://www.eagleseyeblog.com/qbshands-does-size-really-matter.html (reporting hand size of different NFL quarterbacks and discussing
why hand size might matter)
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pain threshold, charisma, and determination to win. Likewise, it is not difficult to
determine if a singer has accurate pitch and a good sense of rhythm, but how truly he
will portray the director’s idea of a particular character in a musical is a matter of
artistic judgment. One therefore would not expect labor markets to be organized by
mechanical rules common in other industries, such as seniority systems or selection or
promotion strictly according to objective test results.
In the most visible parts of entertainment industries81 the labor input comprises sharply
differentiated skills and personalities. No one would consider Tom Brady fungible with
Brett Favre in terms of personality or leadership styles. No one would view Casey
Matthews82 as equivalent to Brian Urlacher83 in terms of skills and experience. No one
would imagine Zac Efron or Jensen Ackles well suited for the same roles on stage or
screen at as Anthony Hopkins or Jack Nicholson. A beginning actor cannot provide the
star quality that many movie and theatre producers believe is necessary to attract an
audience for a large-budget production.
The bargaining structures for entertainment industries reflect the differing
characteristics of the relevant labor markets. Bargaining structures are similar for
different sports involving multi-employer bargaining, comprehensive player
representation and membership, and two-tier bargaining in which the collective
agreement provides a comprehensive framework for regulation of the labor market for
each sport and also regulates certain aspects of the product market to assure
competitive stability, while salaries are negotiated with individual players.84
Professional sports labor markets share common characteristics:



Careers of players are short—3-5 years;
Rules limit player mobility from team to team;

In other less visible parts, many conventional employees toil away at performing accounting,
marketing, information-technology, property-management, human-resource and scheduling functions.
There is nothing particularly unusual about the labor markets for their services.
81
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2011 draft-pick rookie linebacker for Philadelphia Eagles.
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Veteran middle linebacker for the Chicago Bears.
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See Playing for Dollars at 10-11 (describing bargaining structure in professional sports).
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Television broadcast revenues are important;85
Vertical integration is limited, although there may be a trend for entertainment
conglomerates to acquire teams;
Anti-trust law plays a disproportional role in regulating labor markets and their
interaction with product markets; and
Non-union intermediaries such as agents are important.86

Theatrical and movie labor markets also share common characteristics, but also exhibit
differences:








Careers of actors are short, either because their celebrity status wanes, or, in
lower ends of the market, because they give up on being able to make a living
from their art.87
Product markets are highly stratified,88
With the bottom tier growing in importance.
Most actors and production personnel work on a project-by-project basis,
The workforce for each project is assembled on an ad-hoc basis; while there are
repeat players, they must compete anew for each new project through auditions,
Collective bargaining governs labor markets in the upper tiers, but even there,
many workers are not covered by collectively bargained terms.

The differing product-market characteristics of professional sports as compared with
other entertainment industries result in differences in labor markets: professional

For example, in 2000, close to 60% of the Green Bay Packers’ revenue came from television, 20% from
tickets to games, and about 20% from “other”—mainly licensing of logos and paraphernalia. Vogel at 454.
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Playing for Dollars at 168-173 (“Commonality of Sports Models”).

See generally New Business Models for Music at 18 Vill. Sports & Ent. L. J. at 111-136 (describing life
cycle of indie musician). The life cycle of most actors is similar; they go to Chicago, study at Second City,
Steppenwolf, the Artistic Home, or at dozens of other acting studios, get some roles in off-Loop theatre,
and then go to New York or Hollywood, wait tables, and eventually come home to take up other careers,
perhaps continuing to act on the side.
87

88 In 2009, there were some 1825 regional non-profit theatres, compared with Broadway theatres
numbering in the dozens. Vogel at 497 n.7. The non-profit theatre segment of the industry, comprising
mainly off-Broadway and regional theatres earned $811 million in revenue in 2009. Vogel at 497 n.7.
Contributions exceeded revenue, comprising $969 million, or 54%. Id. Broadway shows earned $939
million from Broadway productions in 2007, and $950 from road shows, often performed by regional
producers. Vogel at 482.
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athletes have relatively long term relationships with their teams, and theatre actors
have relationships with their producers for the run of a play; in the movie industry,
actors have only fleeting relationships with their producers, where actor employment is
terminated after a movie is shot, long before any consumers pay to see it. Until recently,
musicians had relatively long-term relationships with their record labels, but the model
is changing, so that the relationship between a musician and a producer ends once a
song or album is recorded.
3.
Proximity of labor and product markets: thickness of the
production function
The labor markets differ in other important ways. The proximity of labor markets to
product markets, reflected in the thickness of the enterprises that connect varies
dramatically. The firms connecting athletes to sports fans—football, baseball, or
basketball teams—are sophisticated enterprises. The same is true for movie production,
distribution, and exhibition enterprises. Music lies at the other extreme: many singers
and instrumentalists are the business entities that perform for audiences. They arrange
their own live gigs and record and release their own music. In music, there is little
distinction between product and labor markets and existing distinctions are
diminishing. Live drama occupies an intermediate position, ranging on a continuum
from Broadway producers to storefront theatre ensembles.89 Technology is slimming
down the entrepreneurial intermediation for music and video entertainment, but not
sports.
The thickness of intermediation represents the distinction between product and labor
markets, which, in turn defines the boundary between antitrust law and labor law. The
robustness of the boundary between labor and product markets depends on the
thickness of the production function:90 how many other inputs are involved, and how
important, relatively, is a particular labor input? The scope of the labor exemptions to

A theatre ensemble is a group of actors who participate in the management of a theatre, expecting that
they will be given priority in the casting of plays the theatre produces.
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A production function is a theoretical equation that specifies output as a function of different
combinations of inputs. In basic microeconomics, the traditional inputs are labor, land, and capital. See
Donald Stevenson Watson, Price Theory and its Uses 198 (1963) (illustrating production functions); Henry
H. Perritt, Jr., New Architectures for Music: Law Should Get Out of the Way, 29 Hastings Comm. & Ent.
L. J. 259, 301 (2007) (specifying production function for production of popular music).
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the antitrust laws depends on separating product from labor markets, but that becomes
more difficult the thinner the production function.
In the lower strata of the popular music industry, there is little distinction between a
worker and entrepreneur. In the top strata of the professional sports and movie
industries there is a major distinction between the owners, coach and general manager
of a team and the players, and between the Hollywood producer and the actor. The
thicker the intermediation, the more likely is employee status for the talent as opposed
to independent contractor status. The most interesting cases are when the production
function is relatively thick, as in professional sports but collective-bargaining and
enforcement of other labor laws is weak: indie movies and indie theater.
4.

Geographic scope

The geographic scope of the relevant labor markets differs. Labor markets for theatre
are predominantly regional. To be sure, many actors relocate to New York or Los
Angeles, because that is where they think the opportunities to make it big are. But most
actors and casting directors direct their attention to the metropolitan area in which they
live and work.
Labor markets for professional sports, on the other hand are national—international in
the case of soccer and baseball.
Labor markets for movies are predominantly regional, given the historic concentration
of moviemaking enterprises in the Los Angeles area, and of television enterprises in Los
Angeles and New York. But moviemaking involves—at least since the breakup of the
studio system, beginning in the 1970s--principal photography at locations all over the
world, and some recruiting of talent takes place in or near shooting locations. The
technological revolution, by dispersing movie production dramatically, means that far
more opportunities to work in moviemaking will be sought and filled locally—within
particular metropolitan areas. Internet-based casting calls are inherently international,
but the likelihood that an applicant will travel a long distance for an audition is small.
5.

Strength of worker attachment

The length of employment is different. Actors and other talent for theatre and movies
are recruited for particular projects—one run of a play, one movie. Athletes are
recruited to sports teams for periods of several seasons, or at least one season.
Recruiting a professional football player to play only one game is unheard of.
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6.

Bifurcation of live performances and recordings

In music the recording and live-concert markets are sharply distinguished, although the
same musicians often participate in both. In professional sports, consumption of
broadcast games and live games is distinct, but the same event provides the content for
both.
7.

Day jobs

Participants in music, theatre, and movie labor markets typically hold other
employment—“day jobs” are the norm.91 Day jobs are rare in professional sports during
the season, but many professional athletes engage in a variety of non-sports
employment off season, often related to investments made with their substantial
salaries. Outside employment often is closely related to the athlete’s identity as an
athlete, as with product endorsements, which may involve work during the season.
8.

Stratification

Stratification of the sub-industries differs dramatically. Professional sports is not very
stratified: most of the relevant activity is centered on the NFL for football, the NBA for
basketball, and so on. Few fans consciously choose between going to an NFL game and
going to a local league game, although some choose between professional and college
football games. College sports are an enigma analytically. They are considered further
in § ___.
Other entertainment industries are hugely stratified, ranging in music from Sony to
singer-songwriter Trevor Shandling, in movies from Dreamworks to Troglodyte
Productions, and in theatre from the Schuman theatre chain on Broadway to the
Weekend Theatre in Little Rock.
One might try to force an apples-to-apples comparative analysis by equating the NFL in
professional sports to big Hollywood studios in moviemaking, big recording labels in
music, Broadway theatre and Live Nation for concert music. A separate analysis would

Professor Caves calls them “humdrum jobs.” Richard E. Caves, Creative Industries: Contracts Between
Art and Commerce 79-80 (2002) (reporting empirical studies concluding that approximately seventy-five
percent of artists of all kinds have humdrum jobs; income from art produced at most forty-six percent of
total income; and for many, was negative).; see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business Models for Music, 18
Vill. Sports & Ent. L. J. 63 (2011) (analyzing life-cycle of indie musicians and the role of day jobs to
supplement music income).
91
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address storefront theatre, indie musicians, indie moviemakers, and or community
football leagues.
The weakness, however, of this apparently tidier horizontal comparison is that it would
obscure the important phenomena: the fluid movement of capital and labor vertically
within the music, video entertainment, and movie industries, and the lack of such
movement in professional sports. It is the increasing possibility of such vertical
movement that poses the greatest likelihood of legal controversies, considered more
fully in § ___.
9.

Cross subsidization

Sports leagues force redistribution of revenue among the teams, especially revenue
from broadcasting.92 They allocate players to clubs through mechanisms such as drafts
of new talent, restrictions on player movement, and compensation to teams losing
players to other teams.93 While some goals, such as the salary cap, are intended to limit
competition in the labor market, others, such as the draft system, are intended as a way
of channeling subsidies to the weaker teams.94
10.

Sources of revenue

Professional football and the movie industry share the characteristic that most of the
revenue comes from channels that might be thought to be ancillary to the main
products. Television revenues account for about 60% of football revenues, compared
with only about 20% for attendance at live games.95 Movie theatre ticket sales account
for only about 20% of the revenue for the movie industry, compared with 40% for video
and DVD rentals and about 40% for television.96
Historically, it has been employees who have insisted on a share of collateral revenue
streams, such television revenues, in professional sports. In the movie industry, it has
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See Richard A. Epstein, Stop the Football Merry-Go-Round,
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been the employers who wanted to share revenue realized after employee performance
was complete, in order to defer employee compensation payments.
As new streams of revenue develop because of new Internet technologies,97 the struggle
to allocate a share to employees will come from the employees, but it also may come
from employers, to the extent that the effect is to shift total revenue from early to later
periods of time.
11.

Stickiness of demand

Professional sports differ from other entertainment industries in that professional sports
teams have loyal followers, who can be counted on to attend games and watch games
on television. In the theatre, movie, and popular music industries, by contrast, each new
product offering is completely speculative: most of the costs must be incurred in
advance, to rehearse a play, to shoot and edit a movie, or to record a song or an album,
with no assurance that any significant number of consumers will pay to see it or hear it.
12.

Financing

The relative importance of capital investment and operating costs differ sharply among
the industries. In professional sports, operating costs for each season are large in
comparison with upfront capital costs. At the opposite end of the spectrum, capital
costs dwarf operating costs in the movie and popular music industries. Theatre falls
somewhere in between.
Theatre differs from professional sports, popular music, and movies in that it receives
most of its funding from subsidies or charitable contributions. 98
13.

Attitude toward collective bargaining

In most industries, employers fight ferociously to avoid unionization and regulation of
their workplaces through collective bargaining. Unions fight equally ferociously to
maintain unionization and collective bargaining. In professional sports, employers want
collective bargaining to shield them from antitrust liability. The employees sometimes
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oppose collective bargaining when they think they can gain more from antitrust
litigation.
In theatre, producers perceive that Equity productions have higher credibility, and that
Equity actors are better than non-Equity actors. These perceptions mute the incentive to
remain non-union for cost and flexibility reasons.
14.

Defining the boundary between product and labor markets

Any analysis of the interaction between antitrust and labor law strains to distinguish
product markets from labor markets. Antitrust law focuses on product markets, while
labor law focuses on labor markets. But the two markets are intertwined. That is why it
so difficult to define the boundaries of the labor exemptions to the antitrust laws. Labor
costs must be reflected in the prices for products and services, and so better
employment terms tend to reduce demand in product markets. Conversely, reduced
revenues in an employer’s product market diminish the resources available to improve
workplace conditions and employee compensation. So an employer’s product market
strategy legitimately is concerned with labor market developments, while employees
and their representatives are legitimately concerned with product market
developments.
Analysis of the boundaries between the two markets must consider issues such as:








Use of contracts rather than integration within the firm.
Continued employment versus project-by-project employment.
Horizontal interdependency—whether firm success depends on interaction with
competitors. (The Chicago Bears are more profitable when they can play teams
like the Green Bay Packers but the attractiveness of Steppenwolf’s plays do not
depend on what Goodman is putting up).
Need for vertical integration: high in entertainment (Schubert; CBS; CAMU;
Paramount Pictures); low in sports.
Whether employees work at multiple levels: sports players also functioning as
coaches; actors directing plays or movies; writers acting, directing, or producing.
Whether independent contractors are firms or individuals.
15.

Sources of controversy

The reasons for friction between antitrust and labor law differs between sports and
other forms of entertainment. In sports, producing a good product requires limits on
competition so that the best teams do not drive out the bad. Labor law is used
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essentially as a shield for these limits, but it also comes into play because so much of the
competition between teams is driven by whom they have on their rosters.
In music, theatre, and movies, the friction occurs because the talent often performs
entrepreneurial functions, and, conversely, entrepreneurial activities represent
competition to the labor market for talent. It is difficult to say when a rock band is
acting in its business capacity and when the members are participating in a labor
market. In low-budget moviemaking, the producer is often indistinguishable from the
director or cinematographer, who often are the actors as well. As technology fuels the
DIY99 phenomenon, this conflation of roles becomes more prominent.

B.

College sports--the enigma

College sports are an anomaly in the entertainment industry. Big-time college football,
for example, is nearly indistinguishable from professional football. Revenue from
broadcast of games rivals revenue from broadcast of NFL games. NFL teams recruit
almost exclusively from the ranks of college football players. Yet college athletes are not
considered employees, and therefore fall completely outside the labor exemptions.
Nevertheless, tight restrictions that the NCAA imposes on competition mostly have
escaped antitrust liability.
“The NCAA’s real role is to oversee the collusion of university athletic departments,
whose goal is to maximize revenue and suppress the wages of its captive labor force.”100
"Judicial opinions examining antitrust claims against NCAA rules are even more
confused than decisions involving the intraleague rules of professional leagues."101 A
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Joe Nocera, The College Sports Cartel, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2011 at p.A21 (arguing in favor of an
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Kreher, 6 Va. Sports & Ent. L. J. at 76.

number of commentators argue that college players should be entitled to engage in
collective bargaining.102
In NCAA v. Board of Regents,103 analyzed more fully infra in section ___, the Supreme
Court found that the NCAA plays a vital role in preserving the competitive character of
college football, broadening consumer choice and the options available to athletes.104
Nevertheless it found these pro-competitive effects insufficient, under the Sherman Act,
to offset the anti-competitive effects of NCAA rules limiting television broadcasts of
games. 105
Most of the antitrust challenges to NCAA restrictions have foundered on the
proposition, usually accepted by the courts, that college athletics does not involve
commercial product or labor markets. In 2011, a district court dismissed an antitrust
class action challenging the NCAA's bylaws prohibiting NCAA members from offering
multi-year athletic scholarships and imposing a cap on the number of athletic-based
discounts a school can offer per sport each year.106 The district court relied on Banks v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,107 in which the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's
decision to grant the NCAA's motion to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint regarding the
no-agent and no-draft rules.108 At issue in Banks were rules prohibiting college athletes
from participating in intercollegiate sports if they agreed to be represented by an agent
or asked to be placed on the draft list of a professional league.109 The district court in

See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCornick, The Myth of the Student Athlete: The College
Athlete as Employee, 81 Washington L. Rev. 71 (2006) (arguing that college athletes are employees under
traditional tests under NLRA); Rohith A. Parasuraman, Unionizing Division I Athletics: A Viable
Solution? 57 Duke L. J. 727 (2007).
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Agnew found that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded that the geographic market
was the entire United States,110 but failed to plead relevant product markets. The
complaint alleged that two product markets were relevant: the market for the sale of
bachelor's degrees and the labor market for the purchase of student athlete services.111
The court rejected the labor market allegation because Banks rejected the idea that
NCAA member schools could be purchasers of labor because the NCAA eligibility and
recruiting requirements prohibit member colleges from engaging in price competition
for players.112 It rejected the product-market allegations because "because people cannot
simply purchase bachelor's degrees at Division I colleges and universities.
Notwithstanding pop culture lyrics to the contrary, you can't just mess around and get
a college degree. Instead, earning a bachelor's degree requires the student to attend
class, take required courses, and maintain certain grades, among many other things." 113
The conclusion with respect to the product market allegations is plausible, but the
conclusion with respect to the alleged labor market is tautological. The reasoning would
defeat any Sherman Act claim in which a cartel is effective in prohibiting competition.
In Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic Association114 the district court denied a
preliminary injunction against NCAA denial of eligibility to a former college football
player because he participated in the NFL draft. The court held that the NCAA's
eligibility rules (as distinct from other NCAA activities) were not subject to the antitrust
laws because they were not commercial activities.115 It also held that even if those
NCAA activities were subject to antitrust scrutiny they would be privileged under rule
of reason analysis because they have the socially beneficial effect of preserving
amateurism in college sports.116 It embraced the district court’s decision in Banks.
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In Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,117 the Sixth Circuit affirmed
dismissal of a Sherman Act claim by a former football coach who challenged NCAA
recruiting rules. The plaintiff coach alleged a group boycott to prevent him from
coaching at NCAA member schools: “The restraint at issue here is NCAA's boycott of
coaches unjustly or excessively punished because of its disciplinary system. These bans
affect interstate commerce by preventing schools across America from hiring boycotted
coaches to generate sports revenue and by preventing these coaches from seeking
gainful employment with NCAA institutions.”118 The court began with the proposition
that a commercial activity must be implicated in order for the Sherman Act to apply:119
"NCAA's rules on recruiting student athletes, specifically those rules prohibiting
improper inducements and academic fraud, are all explicitly non-commercial . . . and
designed to promote and ensure competitiveness amongst NCAA member schools."120
In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation,121 a class action later dismissed for
failure to satisfy class-action standards,122 the district court denied a motion to dismiss
antitrust claims against NCAA scholarship restrictions. The NCAA argued that the
plaintiffs "failed to allege a legally cognizable relevant market because there is no
‘commercial’ or ‘employment market’ for the services of Division I-A football players,
and because Plaintiffs fail to define or identify consumer substitutability,
interchangeability, or cross-elasticity of demand."123
The court reasoned:
"By-law 15.5.5 does not clearly implicate student-athlete eligibility in the same manner
as rules requiring students to attend class and rules revoking eligibility for entering a
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398 F. Supp.2d at 1150 (characterizing NCAA argument on motion to dismiss).

professional draft. . . . [They] were developed to contain costs, not to advance
amateurism. Accordingly, the numerical scholarship limitation at issue in this case is
not on all fours with those cases which hold that NCAA eligibility rules are not subject
to the Sherman Act."124
It also found that the plaintiffs alleged a sufficient market, one in which NCAA member
schools compete for skilled amateur football players as necessary inputs to the
production of Division I football.125 "The market alleged here is a monopsony. Injury to
competition can occur by monopsony just as it may result from monopoly. "126
In Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,127 the Seventh Circuit also recognized
reality—a commercial labor market does exist for the services of college athletes:
"The proper identification of a labor market for student-athletes, on the other hand,
would meet plaintiffs' burden of describing a cognizable market under the Sherman
Act. As an initial matter, labor markets are cognizable under the Sherman Act. The
Banks majority, in dicta, opined that the market for scholarship athletes cannot be
considered a labor market, since schools do not engage in price competition for players,
nor does supply and demand determine the worth of student-athletes' labor. We find
this argument unconvincing for two reasons. First, the only reason that colleges do not
engage in price competition for student-athletes is that other NCAA bylaws prevent
them from doing so. The fact that certain procompetitive, legitimate trade restrictions
exist in a given industry does not remove that industry from the purview of the
Sherman Act altogether. Rather, all NCAA actions that are facially anticompetitive must
have procompetitive justifications supporting their existence. Second, colleges do, in
fact, compete for student-athletes, though the price they pay involves in-kind benefits as
opposed to cash. For instance, colleges may compete to hire the coach that will be best
able to launch players from the NCAA to the National Football League, an attractive
component for a prospective college football player. Colleges also engage in veritable
arms races to provide top-of-the-line training facilities which, in turn, are supposed to
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attract collegiate athletes. Many future student-athletes also look to the strength of a
college's academic programs in deciding where to attend. These are all part of the
competitive market to attract student-athletes whose athletic labor can result in many
benefits for a college, including economic gain."128
It affirmed dismissal of a Sherman Act complaint, however, challenging NCAA
restrictions on athletic scholarships, which it found not clearly pro-competitive, unlike
NCAA eligibility restrictions. The plaintiffs unaccountably had failed to allege existence
of the market.
Although universities hate the idea of collective bargaining for their athletes because it
would increase costs and diminish control, ironically it would offer them broader
protection against antitrust liability.

IV.

Analytical approach
A.

Antitrust generally
1.

The antitrust laws

The goal of antitrust law is to enhance consumer welfare by ensuring that competition
regulates markets:129
“The Sherman Act . . . rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political
and social institutions.”130
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The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits horizontal agreements (agreements among
competitors) that restrain trade and more narrowly prohibits unilateral action that
threatens monopolization. Section 1 of the Sherman Act,131 prohibits contracts that
restrain trade or commerce. Section 2 132 prohibits monopolization of trade or commerce.
The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination likely to lessen competition
unless price differences are justified by differing costs. 133 The Clayton Act prohibits
acquisition of another enterprise when it may "substantially" lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly.134 Labor organizations and their "lawful" conduct in carrying out
their "legitimate objects" are immunized from these prohibitions.135
Section one treats concerted activity more strictly than section two treats unilateral
activity because concerted activity deprives the marketplace of independent centers of
decisionmaking. Restricting it leaves untouched vast arenas for private economic
decisions.136 In the years after enactment of the Sherman Act in 1884, judicial decisions
interpreting the law drew distinctions between agreements among competitors
(“horizontal agreements”) and agreements among firms providing inputs and
consuming outputs of either other’s production activities (“vertical agreements”), and
crafted two tests for determining illegality under the Act: a per se test for the most
egregious restraints such as naked price fixing or output restrictions and a more flexible
rule of reason test for agreements that have both anti-competitive and pro-competitive
effects.
Monopolization is different from market dominance. "Simply possessing monopoly
power and charging monopoly prices does not violate § 2; rather, the statute targets the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
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development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”137
"The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but
against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out of
solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the public interest. Thus, this
Court and other courts have been careful to avoid constructions of § 2 which might chill
competition, rather than foster it. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust
competition from conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects; moreover, single-firm
activity is unlike concerted activity covered by § 1, which inherently is fraught with
anticompetitive risk. For these reasons, § 2 makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful
only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so, . . . [necessitating]
inquiry into the relevant product and geographic market and the defendant's economic
power in that market."138
2.

Rule of reason

Even if a labor exemption does not apply, the restrictions on competition nevertheless
may be justified under rule-of-reason analysis. When anti-competitive measures involve
an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is
to be available at all, careful definition of relevant markets and analysis of the dynamics
in those markets is necessary under the rule of reason.139
The rule of reason recognizes that "a restraint in a limited aspect of a market may
actually enhance marketwide competition."140 Both the per se rule and the rule of reason
are employed “to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
restraint.”141 In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of
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University of Oklahoma,142 the Supreme Court observed that the antitrust laws prohibit
only unreasonable restraints of trade, since "every contract is a restraint of trade."143
Although horizontal price fixing and restraints on output, such as those contained in
the plan, typically are unreasonable as a matter of law, under the per-se approach, the
Court found that rule of reason rather than per se analysis was appropriate because
collegiate football is "an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all."144 "The NCAA plays a vital role in
enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions
widen consumer choice—not only the choices available to sports fans but also those
available to athletes—and hence can be viewed as procompetitive."145
Because the NCAA television plan on its face restrained the operation of a free market,
the antitrust defendants had the burden of establishing a pro-competitive justification.146
The majority found that no procompetitive efficiencies existed to justify the restrictions;
NCAA football could be marketed just as efficiently without the television plan. 147 Nor
was the plan necessary to enable the NCAA to penetrate the market, because college
football broadcasts "constitute a unique product for which there is no ready
substitute."148 Nor did it effectively protect the market for attendance at live football
games.149 Significantly, it held that “The Rule of Reason does not support a defense
based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.”150 "The NCAA's
argument that its television plan is necessary to protect live attendance is not based on a
desire to maintain the integrity of college football as a distinct and attractive product,
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but rather on a fear that the product will not prove sufficiently attractive to draw live
attendance when faced with competition from televised games. At bottom the NCAA's
position is that ticket sales for most college games are unable to compete in a free
market. The television plan protects ticket sales by limiting output—just as any
monopolist increases revenues by reducing output. By seeking to insulate live ticket
sales from the full spectrum of competition because of its assumption that the product
itself is insufficiently attractive to consumers, petitioner forwards a justification that is
inconsistent with the basic policy of the Sherman Act."151 It recognized pro-competitive
legitimacy of the goal of maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic
teams, but found that the plan did not promote that goal. 152
The dissenters153 questioned the majority's assessment of anti-competitive effect,154 and
argued that the plan’s positive effect on the NCAA's fundamental goal of preserving
amateurism and integrating athletic and education155 were “sufficient to offset any
minimal anticompetitive effects . . . ."156
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,157 also illustrates rule of
reason analysis, but it came out the other way, validating a collective licensing system
for musical works. The court of appeals, disagreeing with the district court, held that
the blanket licenses, which uniformly charged fees based on a percentage of total
revenue or a flat fee constituted price fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The
Supreme Court disagreed, finding per se treatment inappropriate, in significant part
because the courts lacked experience with arrangements of the sort being challenged. 158
It found pro-competitive effects because of the impracticability of direct licensing by
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441 U.S. at 10.

thousands of copyright owners, thousands of users, and millions of compositions. The
costs would be prohibitive without blanket licenses. Furthermore the challenged
arrangement was not a naked restraint of trade; it was accompanied by "accompanies
the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright
use."159
Justice Stevens agreed that rule of reason analysis was appropriate rather than per see
illegality, but he dissented on the outcome of the majority's rule of reason analysis. 160
Noting that a practice that might be permissible for a small vendor may become illegal
when employed by a dominant firm, because of its greater impact on competition in the
latter case,161 he concluded that the anti-competitive effects of the challenged
arrangement outweighed its pro-competitive effects, in large part by identifying less
anti-competitive alternatives such as negotiation of music-performing rights on a percomposition or per-use basis, either with the composer or publisher directly or with an
agent such as ASCAP."162
He cautioned that antitrust policy requires close scrutiny of great aggregations of
economic power, especially when the aggregation is based on statutory monopolies
such as copyright.163 That of course is precisely the starting point for many of the
restrictions on competition in entertainment markets.

B.

Labor law
1.

Collective bargaining

Collective bargaining is intended to result in private agreements to restrain competition
in labor markets. The most traditional trade union objective is to restrict the supply of
labor—to establish a monopoly in the labor market.164 Union security clauses such as
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closed-shop agreements and union-shop agreements are means used to achieve that
objective with respect to the employer covered by the agreement: that employer cannot
employ anyone who is not already a member of the union (a closed shop agreement), or
anyone hired by the employer must become and remain a member of the union as a
condition of continued employment (a union shop agreement). That gives the union a
monopoly on the labor supply for that particular employer.165
Almost as common an objective in a traditional unionized industry is the objective of
restricting the demand for labor—to establish a monopsony in the relevant labor
market.166 The union ensures that no employer will employ any worker who is not
represented by the union—or to divorce the monopsony concept from the monopoly
concept—to ensure that no employer employs anyone under terms less favorable than
the union-negotiated terms.
At the pole, a union may seek the establishment of a product market cartel with input
restrictions, so that the product markets for unionized employers are protected from
non-union competition.167
A variety of means can be used to pursue these objectives. The union can withdraw
labor (a strike); it can publicize the conduct of a recalcitrant employer by picketing
and/or other forms of publicity,168 it can cause other firms that supply factors of
production or that purchase products or services to withhold their patronage.169 The
availability of all of these means depends on the union having a beachhead from which
to extend the pressure: a group of employees already represented by the union who
have enough solidarity to make the sacrifice in wages involved in a strike or to incur the
opportunity cost and other costs of picketing or publicizing a dispute.

The agreement may cover only certain crafts or classes of work, in which case the agreement gives the
union a monopoly on the supply of that particular kind of labor.
165
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2.

Economic weapons

Negotiation involves leverage. Rational negotiators accept any negotiated solution that
is better than their BATNAs.170 Various weapons exist to influence an adversary’s
BATNA. In traditional collective bargaining the paradigm is a strike, a lockout, or
unilateral imposition by the employer of new terms and conditions of employment.
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,171 the Supreme Court held that unilateral imposition of a
fixed salary for developmental football players after an impasse in collective bargaining
fell within the non-statutory labor exemption. The Court considered the issue to be:
whether the exemption "appl[ies] to an agreement among several employers bargaining
together to implement after impasse the terms of their last best good-faith wage
offer."172 It noted that unilateral implementation of proposed terms of employment after
an impasse in multiemployer bargaining was a "familiar practice" in multiemployer
bargaining, as well as in single employer bargaining.173 It concluded that the nonstatutory exemption applied.174
A more recent case, probably decided incorrectly, is California ex rel Harris v. Safeway,
Inc.175 It involved a mutual strike assistance agreement (the “RSP”) among California
grocery-store chains. Under the agreement, any grocer that earned revenues above its
historical share relative to the other chains during strike or lockout period would pay
15% of those excess revenues as reimbursement to the other grocers to restore their prestrike shares.176 The agreement was intended to ameliorate the effects of a selective
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Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 Geo. L. J. 1625, 1637 (1986) (explaining BATNA
concept).
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strike, also known as "whipsawing." The grocers argued that the non-statutory
exemption immunizes employers agreements related in time and circumstance to the
collective-bargaining process, and that the economic weapons parties use to advance
their positions in a labor dispute—like an agreement to share revenue to weaken the
effects of a whipsaw strike—are ‘as much a part of the collective bargaining process as
are negotiations over terms.’”177 The en banc court of appeals rejected the argument,
finding no body of regulatory or judicial decisions that establishes employer revenue
sharing as an "an accepted economic weapon during a labor dispute."178 The court also
noted that the challenged agreement primarily affected the product market, while most
of the non-statutory labor exemption cases involved employer activity primarily
directed at the labor market.179
The decision is wrong because the mutual assistance pact concerned collective
bargaining; its only purpose was to enhance employer bargaining power by reducing
the injury that could be inflicted by a strike or lockout. The dissent pointed to a number
of NLRB and courts cases validating a variety of economic weapons to combat whipsaw
strike tactics, strike insurance provided by unions, employer strike insurance plans, and
in Air Line Pilots Ass'n International v. Civil Aeronautics Board.,180 , an employer mutual
aid pact containing a provision "almost identical to the RSP" at issue in the Harris case.181
In Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intern. v. CAB,182 cited by dissenting circuit judge Kozinski in
Harris, airline unions challenged the Civil Aeronautics Board approval of a mutual aid
pact entered into by airlines. The pact provided for strike payments A strikebound
company received payments from other Pact members equal to their increase in
revenues resulting from the strike minus their added operating expenses in servicing
the new business.183 Upholding the pact, the court reasoned that "The national labor

177

Id. at 1128 (summarizing employer position).

178

Id. at 1129.

179

Id. at 1131.
502 F.2d 453 (D.C.Cir.1974)

180

181

Id. at *17, *19 (Kozinski, C.J. dissenting).

182

502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

183

502 F.2d at 456.

47

policy rests on the principle that parties should be free to marshal the economic
resources at their disposal in the resolution of a labor dispute, consistent with the
specific rights and prohibitions established by the labor statutes."184 It aligned itself with
the Second Circuit, which, in Kennedy v. Long Island Railroad Co..,185 approved an
employer strike insurance plan in the railroad industry.186
3.

The labor exemptions to the antitrust laws—in general

Much of the history of collective bargaining in professional football was shaped by the
statutory and non-statutory exemptions to the antitrust laws. These exemptions
similarly determine the scope of permissible workplace regulations in all sectors of the
entertainment industry.
a)

The labor laws

The labor laws comprise the Norris-LaGuardia Act,187 which divests federal courts of
jurisdiction to issue injunctions in “labor disputes,” the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”),188 The Labor Management Relations Act,189 the Norris La-Guardia Act,190 and
the Railway Labor Act.191 Section 7 of the NLRA192 and section 2 of the Railway Labor
Act193 grant broad rights to employees to engage in collective bargaining through
representatives of their choice. Means and ends in collective bargaining are not
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unlimited in scope, however. Labor law restricts use of these weapons, but only when
they are used by union actors.194
A number of other statutes regulate aspects of the employment relationship, but the
ones named here provide the basic statutory framework for collective bargaining, which
is the core of the labor exemption.
b)

Statutory exemption

A "statutory" labor exemption, derived from the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act shields labor unions from antitrust liability.195 Without the exemption, labor unions
would be a paradigmatic combination to fix wages. When labor unions enter into
agreements with others such as employers, however, they are outside the statutory
exemption.196
c)

Non-statutory exemption

Agreements among businessmen are subject to the antitrust laws. Columbia River
Packers Ass'n v. Hinton,197 involved a suit for an injunction brought by a fish-packing
enterprise, claiming that the defendants violated the Sherman Act. The defendant,
styling itself the "Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union,” actually was a fishermen's
association. The fishermen owned or leased fishing boats, and carried on their business
as independent entrepreneurs.198 The "union" acted as an agent for sale of fish caught by
its members. It prohibited members from selling fish outside of the agreement, and
prohibited purchasers from purchasing fish from nonmembers.199
The court of appeals, reversing the district court, held that the Norris-LaGuardia act
foreclosed an injunction, because a labor dispute was involved. The Supreme Court
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reversed, concluding that "a dispute among businessmen over the terms of a contract
for the sale of fish" is different from "controversy concerning terms or conditions of
employment, or concerning the association of persons seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment."200 The Norris-LaGuardia Act applies, the Court held, only
when "the employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy."201
"The controversy here is altogether between fish sellers and fish buyers. The sellers are
not employees of the petitioners or of any other employer nor do they seek to be. On the
contrary, their desire is to continue to operate as independent businessmen, free from
such controls as an employer might exercise."202
Nevertheless union agreements with non-union parties may be within a "nonstatutory"
exemption if the agreement is "intimately related to the union's vital concerns of wages,
hours, and working conditions."203 The non-statutory exemption is necessary because
the statutory exemption does not exempt concerted action by non-labor parties or
agreements between labor unions and non-labor parties.204
The early cases recognized this non-statutory exemption but found it to be inapplicable.
“The Supreme Court has never delineated the precise boundaries of the [non-statutory
labor] exemption, and what guidance it has given as to its application has come mostly
in cases in which agreements between an employer and a labor union were alleged to
have injured or eliminated a competitor in the employer's business or product
market.”205
The Court first addressed the non-statutory labor exemption in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local
Union No. 3. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,206 involving a series of
agreements between an electrical workers union and several manufacturers and
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contractors in which the manufacturers and contractors agreed not to do business with
non-union firms. Congress did not intend to bestow on unions “complete and
unreviewable authority to aid business groups to frustrate [antitrust legislation's]
primary objective.”207
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington208 the Supreme Court similarly declined
to apply the exemption to insulate a wage agreement between a union of mine workers
and large coal companies. There were, the Court explained, “limits to what a union or
an employer may offer or extract in the name of wages,”209 Measures adopted with the
purpose of eliminating smaller coal companies and permitting larger companies to
control the market were outside those limits.210 “[A] union forfeits its exemption from
the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers
to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units.”211 The Court held that the
challenged agreement was not exempt from the antitrust laws.212
The leading early case finding that conduct fell within the exemption is Local Union No.
189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. Jewel Tea Co.213 The
union representing butchers in Chicago reached a collective-bargaining agreement with
a multi-employer bargaining unit of food retailers that included a marketing hours
restriction, which prohibited the sale of meat before 9:00 a.m. and after 6:00 p.m., and
on Sundays.214 The plurality opinion explained that “the marketing-hours restriction,
like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and working
conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain that provision ... falls within the
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protection of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman
Act.”215
The basic outlines of the non-statutory exemption were visible in these early cases:
direct restrictions on product markets lay outside the exemption; indirect effects on
product markets from terms closely related to wages and working conditions lay within
the exemption.
The term "nonstatutory" was first used by the Supreme Court in Connell Const. Co., Inc.
v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100.216 In that case, the Court declined to
apply the non-statutory exemption to a union-employer agreement. 217A building trades
union entered into a multi-employer bargaining agreement with a large group of
mechanical contractors.218 The union asked Connell Construction—a general building
contractor that was outside the bargaining agreement and whose workers were not
represented by the union—to agree to subcontract mechanical work only to firms
covered by the multiemployer agreement.219 Connell initially refused to sign the
agreement but acquiesced when the unions picketed one of its construction sites.220 The
exemption did not shield the agreement from the antitrust laws because such a “direct
restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and
potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over
wages and working conditions.”221
Circuit Judge Harry Edwards said this about the non-statutory exemption:
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"one principle that seems clear: restraints on competition lawfully imposed through the
collective bargaining process are exempted from antitrust liability so long as such
restraints primarily affect only the labor market organized around the collective
bargaining relationship."222
"[T]here may be a ‘labor dispute’ where the disputants do not stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee. But the statutory classification, however broad, of
parties and circumstances to which a labor dispute' may relate does not expand the
application of the Act to include controversies upon which the employer-employee
relationship has no bearing."223
d)
Congruence of labor exemption with scope of NLRA and
Norris-LaGuardia
The scope of a labor dispute under Norris-LaGuardia has the same boundaries as the
labor exemption because the labor exemption is based on Norris-LaGuardia.224
Likewise, the labor exemption should have the same boundaries as employee status
under the NLRA, because otherwise the employees do not have the right to engage in
collective bargaining. Promotion of collective bargaining is the labor policy that trumps
antitrust policy.
Judge Edwards derived two principles from the decided cases:
"First, the exemption must be broad enough in scope to shield the entire collective
bargaining process established by federal law. Second, the case for applying the
exemption is strongest where a restraint on competition operates primarily in the labor
market and has no anti-competitive effect on the product market."225
There is no collective bargaining process to shield if the workers involved in a dispute
are not statutory “employees” entitled to participate in it. Nevertheless, there may be
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some statutory non-employees who are so closely tied to a labor market in which
collective bargaining operates that restrictions on their competition may be within the
exemption.226
"[N]ot all combinations of unions with entrepreneurs or independent contractors fall
outside the statutory exemption. The second part of the Hutcheson requirement of
unilateral conduct authorizes a broad interpretation of “labor group.” Even though a
challenged combination includes independent contractors or entrepreneurs, it may
come within the statutory exemption if the non-employee parties to the combination are
in job or wage competition with the employee parties, or in some other economic
interrelationship that substantially affects the legitimate interests of the employees."227
There must be some statutory employees involved, however.
"We recognize, of course, that, as a general matter, the antitrust laws may apply to
restraints on competition in non-unionized labor markets. However, we think the
inception of a collective bargaining relationship between employees and employers
irrevocably alters the governing legal regime. Once employees organize a union, federal
labor law necessarily limits the rights of individual employees to enter into negotiations
with their employer. Indeed, employers are positively prohibited from seeking to
bargain with individual employees, absent consent from the union. Moreover,
employers may lawfully reduce competition in the labor market by forming multiemployer bargaining units, allowing for standardization of wage rates and working
conditions within an industry. Thus, once collective bargaining begins, the Sherman Act
paradigm of a perfectly competitive market necessarily is replaced by the NLRA
paradigm of organized negotiation—a paradigm that itself contemplates collusive
activity on the parts of both employees and employers. Stubborn adherence to antitrust
principles in such a market can only result in “a wholesale subversion” of federal labor
policy."228
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In Brady v. National Football League,229 however, the court of appeals accepted the parties'
stipulation that "the Act's restrictions on equitable relief are not necessarily coextensive
with the substantive rules of antitrust law . . . ."230 It held that a "labor dispute" may exist
under Norris-LaGuardia even if no union exists.231 Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument
that the Act only prohibits injunctions against unions and employees, it also held that a
lockout is covered by the specific activities shielded from injunctions by the Act.232
When either labor exemption applies, it is likely that the NLRB has primary jurisdiction,
displacing the authority of the courts, to decide the merits of any dispute over
interpretation of the labor laws.233
e)

Means and ends

The extent of the labor exemptions depends on the objectives (ends) of the challenged
arrangement and the means used to achieve them. The Clayton Act refers to lawful
means to achieve legitimate objectives,234 in taking collective bargaining outside the
scope of antitrust law. Analysis of these factors frequently overlaps assessment of the
anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects in antitrust rule-of-reason analysis.
f)

Coverage of independent contractors

The general view is that independent contractors may not benefit from the labor
exemption by banding together and calling themselves a labor union.235 In Allied
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Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,236 the Supreme Court reviewed
the evolution of the statutory definition of employee, noting that Congress had
amended the statute explicitly to exclude "independent contractors," after the Supreme
Court, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,237 agreed with the NLRB that newspaper street
vendors were statutory employees.238
The prohibition is not absolute, however:
"Even though a challenged combination includes independent contractors or
entrepreneurs, it may come within the statutory exemption if the non-employee parties
to the combination are in job or wage competition with the employee parties, or in some
other economic interrelationship that substantially affects the legitimate interests of the
employees.”239
In Taylor v. Journeymen Horseshoers,240 the en banc Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on
Columbia River Packers, reversed the district court and held that farriers (workers that
shoe horses) were independent contractors and therefore outside the labor exemption.
The case arose when a union representing Maryland farriers insisted that trainers and
owners of race horses use only union farriers and further threatened to expel any union
member who worked for less that union scale. The court of appeals found that the nonunion farriers were independent contractors because they set their own working hours,
because they worked for more than one trainer and owner, and because the trainers and
owners did not concern themselves with how the task of shoeing a horse was
accomplished but only with the end result.241 Their status as independent contractors
led to the conclusion that no labor dispute was involved, and therefore that the NorrisLaGuardia Act and the labor exemption did not foreclose an injunction again the
violation of the Sherman Act.

236

404 U.S. 157 (1971).

237

, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).

238

404 U.S. at 167.

239

Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 578, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)

240

353 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1965).

241

353 F.2d at 597-598.

56

"The only interests sought to be advanced by the activities of these defendants are the
interests of those independent horseshoers who render services to trainers and owners
for a certain fee, unilaterally fixed, per horse. They are independent businessman,
specialists in their line, who have banded together and who act in concert for their
mutual benefit and improvement. We fail to discover the existence of any employeremployee relationship which is the ‘Matrix’ of this controversy or any condition which,
under the provisions of either the Clayton Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act, would
protect the activities of the defendants."242
Circuit judges Sobeloff and Bell dissented,
"The dispute between the farriers and the owners concerns the reward paid the farriers
for their labor. The refusal to handle the Canadians' horses grows out of the latter's use
of labor which undercut wage standards the union deemed fair. The defendants'
conduct involves nothing more than the withholding of their labor in order to coerce
the owners to have all work performed under minimum union standards. Such a
withholding of labor does not violate the antitrust laws. "243
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild,244 holding the free-lance directors were
employees, discussed infra at § ___, distinguished Taylor.
When no labor union and no statutory employees are involved at all, the non-statutory
exemption is unavailable. Conley Motor Express, Inc. v. Russell,245 involved an
association of owner-operator truck drivers that had been denied status as a labor union
by the NLRB. The association picketed a trucking company that employed its members,
seeing recognition as bargaining agent and obtained a more favorable financial
arrangement. The existing arrangement paid the drivers a share of the fee that the
trucking company received for hauling steel.246 The trucking company's legal theory
was violation of the antitrust laws, a position that the truckers did not contest. The
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argued that they were shielded from injunctive relief by Norris-LaGuardia.247 The court
of appeals affirmed grant of a preliminary injunction against the picketing, finding that
the primary prerequisite for exemption from the anti-trust laws was lacking, “i.e., that
their dispute with Conley involves an employer-employee relationship."248
Whether someone performing work is an employee or independent contractor is
determined under the general common law of agency, which requires evaluation of the
hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished, which involves analysis of the following factors:









the skill required;249
the source of the instrumentalities and tools;250
the location of the work;251
the duration of the relationship between the parties;252
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired
party;253
the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;254
the method of payment;255
the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;256
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500 at 125-126 (summariizng positions of parties).

248
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Lower-skilled workers are more likely to be employees

249

250

If the worker provides his own tools, he is more likely to be an independent contractor.

251

If work is performed only at the hiring party’s facilities, the worker is more likely to be an employee.

252

The longer the relationship, the more likely is employee status.

253

If the hiring party does, employee status is more likely.

If the worker defines the times and durations, he is more likely to be an independent contractor; if he
punches a time clock, he is more likely to be an employee.
254

Periodic payment by the hour, week, month, or year makes employee status more likely. Payment by
project makes independent contractor status more likely.
255

If the worker hires her own assistants and pays them directly, she is more likely to be an independent
contractor
256
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whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;257
whether the hired party is in business;258
the provision of employee benefits;259 and
the tax treatment of the hired party.260

In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc.,261 HBO filed an antitrust action
against an association of freelance directors. The directors defended based on the labor
exemption. The district court decided that the statutory exemption applied. Its
reasoning is especially pertinent to the subject of this article, because it emphasizes a
trend of shifting work from traditional employees to freelance workers:
"Several characteristics of freelance directors' activities tend to suggest that they are
independent contractors in the sale of their services. Freelance directors may accept or
reject offers to direct particular shows. They usually contract to work on an individual
program rather than for a fixed period. Under Guild agreements, they are paid flat fees
for work up to a certain number of days and may accept more than one assignment
simultaneously from different employers. They have considerable discretion over who
will serve as their assistants, particularly the associate director and technical crew; often
these assistants work repeatedly with the same director. Freelance directors also have
special skills, based on substantial training and experience. They necessarily have
considerable discretion in exercising their skills, working closely with all the talent
associated with a show, contributing creatively to all the elements of a show, and
working to mold those elements into a coherent whole that has the “look” sought by the
individual in charge of the production. A producer may specify the desired result, but
the director usually decides initially how that result is to be achieved.”262
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Payment of benefits such as health care insurance and pension benefits makes employee status more
likely.
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Nevertheless, the court identified other characteristics of the labor market that
suggested treatment as employees: Freelance directors risked no monetary capital in
shows and did not share in any profits. They did not get paid for a defined output,
instead receiving additional compensation for each additional day of work,
reimbursement for their expenses, and fringe benefits. Many were treated as employees
for tax purposes. They did not control either the time or place of their work.”263
These characteristics combined to drive the outcome of application of the right-tocontrol test:
“Freelance directors have no ‘“right to control’” the creative elements of shows they
direct. Guild agreements expressly reserve to employers the power to supervise and
control freelance directors. Producers have complete discretion in determining what
revisions, deletions, or abridgements to make on directors' work product. . . . Where
directors are left with substantial control and creative authority, it is because producers
decide that such a policy is appropriate for the show involved or necessary to
accommodate a particularly powerful director. Even famous, award-winning directors,
however, are often closely supervised by their producers.
“* * *
“Thus, although freelance directors may independently contract for their work, once
engaged they perform their tasks, albeit with skill and creativity, as employees.
“* * *
Relevant to the theme of this article, the court found that “the trend to freelance status
for directors has not been the result solely of a desire by directors for greater creative
independence. Rather, it is the product of many forces, and particularly . . . pressures to
surrender control over programming, pressures that have led to the establishment of
numerous independent production companies. These smaller entities have less need
and capacity to retain full-time staff directors. Furthermore, the need for directorial
services was reduced in all production entities by the advent of tape and other filming
techniques; live television programming, which created a great need for directorial
services, has now been substantially abandoned in many areas. The networks and
production companies have retained full-time staff directors chiefly to work on
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programs produced on a regular basis, and they have reduced the number of such
directors in large part because they need fewer full-timers.”264
Even if the directors were not employees, “the similarity of functions and overlap of
capacities among staff and freelance directors creates a mutuality of interest that readily
justifies their bargaining collectively. If minimum wages or other conditions of
employment differed materially for these two groups, the terms of employment enjoyed
by the more advantaged group could well be affected by the availability of directorial
services in the other group at lower prices. Staff and freelance directors are to a
considerable extent interchangeable; indeed, employer decisions more than anything
else determine throughout the industry whether a set of directors is staff or freelance.
Thus, staff and freelance directors are in much stronger job competition than were the
musicians and bandleaders in American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, supra,
which permitted a bargaining combination of the two groups."265
In Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc.,266 the district court
determined that stage directors were entitled to labor exemption because they were
employees. The producer exercised control over every aspect of work. One with
experience in theatre might dispute the general validity of this assertion. In many
productions, the director is the boss.
In Ring v. Spina,267 the court determined that playwrights were not entitled to the labor
exemption:
"Here not only are the disputing parties not in an employer-employee relationship, but,
unlike the Allen Bradley case, the controversy cannot concern itself with conditions of
employment, since none of the parties affected are in any true sense employees. An
author writing a book or play is usually not then even in any contractual relation with
his producer. If and when he does contract, he does not continue in the producer's
service to any appreciable or continuous extent thereafter. Normally the author appears
more nearly like the fishermen entrepreneurs of the Hinton case or the doctors in the
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American Medical Association case than workmen banded together in a union. The
minimum price and royalties provided by the Basic Agreement, unlike minimum wages
in a collective bargaining agreement, are not remuneration for continued services, but
are the terms at which a finished product or certain rights therein may be sold. And no
wages or working conditions of any group of employees are directly dependent on
these terms. We think the exception therefore inapplicable."268
This line of cases suggests the following rules of thumb for combinations involving
persons nominally characterized as independent contractors:
Some independent contractors are shielded by the labor exemption if they are
substitutes for employees. Independent contractors who are truly independent,
however, such as indie musicians, independent theatre companies or producers, or
indie movie-makers enjoy no labor exemption.
4.

Statutory anti-competitive approaches—FLSA

Even when collective bargaining does not operate, the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act269 puts a floor under labor-market competition, by prohibiting employers from
paying less than the minimum wage270 and by limiting the number of hours per week
that employees may work without being paid a premium—usually time and a half their
regular wage for hours worked in excess of forty.271 These limits on competition,
however, are not comprehensive in scope. The Act excludes independent contractors;
professionals and managers, in particular actors and writers; and students.
The six-factor Silk test, discussed in sec. ___, is used to determine whether someone is a
covered employee under the FLSA.272 Actors, even participants in reality television
shows, usually qualify as employees rather than independent contractors.273
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148 F.2d at 652.
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29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
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29 U.S.C. § 206.
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29 U.S.C. § 207.

Adam P. Greenberg, Reality's Kids: Are Children Who Partiicpate on Reality Television Shows
Covered Under the Fair Labor Standards Act? 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 595, 612-617 (2009) [hereinafter
"Greenberg"] (arguing that federal FLSA covers child actors; explaining each of the six factors and citing
cases).
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a)

FLSA exemption for actors, writers, and directors

The FLSA exempts certain professional employees from the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the act.274 State labor standards regulation typically provides a
similar exemption.275 Arguments persist, however, over when performers and writers
perform sufficiently creative work to quality for the artist exemption.276
b)

Coverage of volunteers and students

The effect of the FLSA in the entertainment industries is further limited because it does
not cover most volunteers, thus exempting many participants in small-scale theatre and
moviemaking. It also does not cover students, thus exempting college athletes.277 In

See Greenberg, 82 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 632-638 (working through each of the six factors). Mr. Greenberg's
analysis of child actors in reality shows leads, a fortiori, to the conclusion that adult actors on scripted
shows are employees, because they are subject to even great control by producers and directors. He
admits however that involvement for less than a full season might cause the permanence-of-employment
factor to militate against employee status. Greenberg, 82 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 644 (participating in only one
episode is not permanent enough).
273

See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); 29 CFR § 541.302(c) (noting that actors generally meet the requirements of
professional exemptions from FLSA)
274

See Califonia INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION ORDER NO. 10-2001 REGULATING WAGES,
HOURS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE AMUSEMENT AND RECREATION INDUSTRY,
http://www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/IWCArticle10.pdf (requiring $8 per hour and time and a half for overtime).
See id. sec. 2(A)(defining "amusement and recreation industry" to include theatres); sec. 1(A)(3)(b)(ii)
(exempting original and creative work in a recognized field of artistic endeavor, to be construed pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. Sections 541.207, 541.301(a)-(d), 541.302, 541.306, 541.307, 541.308, and 541.310)
275

See Alexis Miller, Reality Check for Production Companies: Why Writers on Reality Television Are
Entitled to Overtime Pay, 27 Loy. L. A. Ent. L. Rev. 185 (2006-2007) (arguing that reality telvision writers
are not sufficiently creative to quality for the FLSA artist exemption; also reviewing possibility of
representation by Writers Guild); Adam P. Greenberg, Reality's Kids: Are Children Who Partiicpate on
Reality Television Shows Covered Under the Fair Labor Standards Act? 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 595, 612-617
(2009) [hereinafter "Greenberg"]. Mr. Greenberg argues that child performers on reality television shows
should not qualify as exempt actors for policy reasons that should, in his view, narrow the actor
exemption for reality show child participants. Greenberg, 82 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 642 (noting that producers
often deny "actor" status to avoid union representation for AFTRA and SAG).
276

But see Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College Athletics as a Civil
Rights Issue, 36 Howard L. J. 259, 279-280 (1993) (proposing litigation claiming that college athletes are
employees within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act and state workers compensation statutes).
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Purdham v. Fairfax County School Board,278 the Court of appeals affirmed a holding by
the district court that a high-school golf coach was a "volunteer," and thus was not
entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA. Like other coaches in the school
system, the plaintiff held a regular, salaried job with the school system and coached on
the side. He received reimbursement of expenses and a $2100 "stipend" for his coaching
activities.279 As the dispute was developing, the Department of Labor issued a "guidance
opinion letter," concluding that certain school coaches were volunteers instead of
employees.280
"Under the FLSA, “ ‘employ’ [means] to suffer or permit to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). To
be sure, this definition was “not intended to stamp all persons as employees who,
without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own
advantage on the premises of another,” nor should it be interpreted so as to ‘sweep
under the Act each person who, without promise or expectation of compensation, but
solely for his personal purpose or pleasure, work[s] in activities carried on by other
persons either for their pleasure or profit.
“* * *
“The FLSA does not itself define volunteer, but pursuant to a Department of Labor
regulation promulgated under the FLSA, a volunteer is an individual who performs
hours of service for a public agency for civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons,
without promise, expectation or receipt of compensation for services rendered. 29 C.F.R.
§ 553.101(a). At the same time, ‘[v]olunteers may be paid expenses, reasonable benefits,
a nominal fee, or any combination thereof, for their service without losing their status as
volunteers.’ 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(a)."281
The usual definition of "employee" is not helpful in the volunteer context, says the
Fourth Circuit:
"Other courts have looked to the economic realities test in the FLSA context in
determining whether an individual is an employee or a volunteer. However, they have
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637 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2011).
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637 F.3d at 425.
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637 F.3d at 436 (describing, but not citing, DOL letter).
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637 F.3d at 427-428 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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concluded that the test is best suited to determine whether, as a matter of economic
reality, an individual is in business for himself or herself as an independent contractor,
or is an employee of another. As a result, the economic realities test is of limited utility
in determining whether an individual is an ‘employee,’ as opposed to a ‘volunteer.’"282
The likelihood that college athletes are protected by the FLSA is low because of the
pervasive view that they qualify as “students.” While some courts have used the
economic reality test from independent-contractor controversies to assess student
status, most examine whether the individual performing work or the institution for
which he works receives the primary benefit of the work.283
The challenges for anyone wishing to assert FLSA protection for college athletes are
manifold. First the athletes are formally classified as students; indeed NCAA eligibility
rules require student status as a pre-requisite for playing college sports.284 In Agnew v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,285 the court emphasized the centrality of NCAA
eligibility rules in defining the nature of college sports.
On the other hand:
"No knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-time college football
programs competing for highly sought-after high school football players do not
anticipate economic gain from a successful recruiting program. Despite the nonprofit
status of NCAA member schools, the transactions those schools make with premier
athletes—full scholarships in exchange for athletic services—are not noncommercial,
since schools can make millions of dollars as a result of these transactions. FN5 Indeed,
this is likely one reason that some schools are willing to pay their football coaches up to
$5 million a year rather than invest that money into educational resources. . . . Thus, the
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637 F.3d at 433-434 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 532 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming denial
of injunction for violation of FLSA child-labor provisions by school that emphasized practical work for
training purposes; reviewing cases and applying primary benefit test).
283

NCAA Division I Manual § 12.01.1 (2012),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1_2012_01.pdf ("Only an amateur student-athlete
is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport").
284

___ F.3d ___, No. 11-3066, 2012 WL 2248509 at *11 (7th Cir. June 18, 2012) (affirming dismissal of
Sherman Act suit challenging limitation on athletic scholarships).
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transactions between NCAA schools and student-athletes are, to some degree,
commercial in nature, and therefore take place in a relevant market with respect to the
Sherman Act."286

In evaluating NCAA limitations on scholarships, however, it recognized that
scholarships are a form of payment for services, in effect recognizing that playing sports
is performing "work" for the sponsoring college:
"It is true that the prohibition against multi-year scholarships is, in a sense, a rule
concerning the amount of payment a player receives for his labor, and thus may seem to
implicate the split between amateur and pay-for-play sports. After all, student-athletes
are paid, but their payment is limited to reimbursement for costs attendant to receiving
an education. For the purposes of college sports, and in the name of amateurism, we
consider players who receive nothing more than educational costs in return for their
services to be ‘unpaid athletes.’"287
It is clear from this and other language quoted from the opinion in § ___ that the
Seventh Circuit thought that a labor market subject to the Sherman Act could be
alleged, but it found that the plaintiff's complaint did not allege it. 288 If a labor market
exists, that presupposes that the services performed are “work,” thus opening the door
to FLSA claims.

V.

Tolerance of certain anti-competitive arrangements

Despite their identification with the promotion of competition, the antitrust laws
tolerate certain anti-competitive arrangements likely to enhance efficiency and therefore
consumer welfare. Prominent among these are restrictions on competition in labor
markets. Others include anti-competitive regimes that also have pro-competitive effects
outweighing the diminution in competition.

Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, ___ F.3d ___, No. 11-3066, 2012 WL 2248509 at *9 hn 13.
(7th Cir. June 18, 2012) (affirming dismissal of Sherman Act suit challenging limitation on athletic
scholarships)
286

287

Agnew at *12.

288

Agnew as *15 hn 19, 20.
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Some of these anti-competitive arrangements may be within the labor exemptions,
when the employer-employee relationship is the matrix of the controversy. Others are
outside them, but are nevertheless permissible because their pro-competitive effects
outweigh their harm to competition. This part of the article analyzes typical anticompetitive arrangements in the entertainment industries, asking whether they are
within the labor exemptions and, regardless of whether they are, the strength of their
pro-competitive justifications within the rule of reason.
Because the distinction between labor markets and product markets289 is almost as
indistinct as the boundaries of the labor exemptions, this part makes no attempt to
classify restrictions as product-market restrictions as opposed to labor market
restrictions.

A.
Supreme court touchstrones for anti-competitive labor market
arrangements
The law privileges anti-competitive labor market arrangements under the labor
exemptions to the antitrust laws and under labor standards legislation.
Synthesizing from the most prominent Supreme Court cases considering the labor
exemptions, one can conclude:








An agreement by employers to do business only with union subcontractors is
outside the exemption (Allen Bradley)
An agreement to put smaller employers out of business is outside the exemption
(Pennington)
An agreement by non-union firm to subcontract work only to union firms is
outside the exemption (Connell)
Independent contractors may be covered by the exemption if they compete with
employees (H. A. Artists)
An agreement to limit hours of operation is within the exemption (Jewell Tea)
An agreement by employer-association members to provide strike benefits to
each other may be within or without the exemption (Safeway)
Unilateral imposition, after impasse, of a fixed salary is within the exemption
(Brown)

See § ___ (explaining variability of the thickness of intermediation between product and labor
markets).
289
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B.

Concerted refusals to deal

Refusals to deal with workers in a particular class or concerted refusals to deal with
firms in a particular class are mainstream limitations on competition. Indeed, every
contract represents an indirect refusal to deal. When a supply contract, say with an ISP
for an Internet connection, is exclusive, it expressly constitutes a refusal to deal with
other ISPs for the term of the contract. Even when it is not exclusive—as most are not—
it lessens the demand for Internet connections through other sellers because most
Internet users need only one connection at a particular facility. Such contracts enhance
the functioning of competitive markets because they provide certainty of supply and
price and strengthen the position of both parties to the contract.290
Concerted refusals to deal are more suspect than unilateral ones, because they have
stronger anti-competitive effect: they foreclose more of the market for those who are
locked out of the deal. Concerted refusals to deal are suspect under the antitrust laws
because they limit competition by persons or entities excluded by the agreement. At the
highest level of abstraction, concerted refusals to deal involve networks that controls
access to a resource—jobs or product market channels. The network denies access to
anyone who is not a member of the network. This could involve a horizontal labor
network such as a union membership agreement that prohibits members from working
for a non-union employer, or it could be a horizontal product network, such as a
collective bargaining agreement that prohibits an employer from using non-union labor.
But even concerted refusals to deal can have sufficient pro-competitive effects to
withstand antitrust attack.291
Concerted refusals to deal abound in labor and product markets in the entertainment
industries—as they indeed do in every industry. Virtually every collectively bargaining
arrangement in the entertainment industries provides an absolute or limited preference

“One problem presented by the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act is that it cannot mean what it
says. The statute says that ‘every’ contract that restrains trade is unlawful. But, as Mr. Justice Brandeis
perceptively noted, restraint is the very essence of every contract; read literally, § 1 would outlaw the
entire body of private contract law. Yet it is that body of law that establishes the enforceability of
commercial agreements and enables competitive markets-indeed, a competitive economy-to function
effectively." City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 385 n.1 (1991) (rejecting
antitrust challenge to municipality's restrictions on outdoor advertising).
290

See Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com'n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that procompetitive effects of horizontal agreements among patent holders to set standards for writable CDs was
valid under rule of reason).
291
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for certain employees.292 The NFL collective bargaining agreement293 requires players
either to become members of the union or to pay the union a "service fee,"294 and
prohibits teams from entering into contracts with players other the form contracts
provided in the collective agreement.295 Television labor agreements limit employment
to union members.296 Actors Equity prohibits working except under an Equity
contract,297 and provides for expulsion of members who work without a contract or
Equity approval.298 It controls the hiring process for Equity productions through its
regulated audition process. 299

Compare CAT Rule 48(F) (prohibiting employment of "non-professionals" until specified number of
Equity actors have been employed) with CAT Rule 40 (explicitly permitting employment of "nonprofessionals").
292

NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (Aug. 4, 2011),
https://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/2011CBA.pdf
293

294

NFL Agreeemnt Art. 47, sec. 1.

295

NFL Agreement Art. 4.

AFTRA 2010-2011 Interactive Media Agreement § 13, http://www.aftra.org/documents/20102011_IMA_Code_FINAL.pdf (prohibiting employer signatory from employing performers who are not
members of AFTRA or who make application for membership within 30 days)
296

"[I]f you are an Equity member, you may not accept any work in Equity jurisdiction without the
appropriate contract. Even if the project is not listed here; you are still obligated to call Equity if you are
offered any stage work without a union contract." Equity 4As "Do Not Work" Notice,
http://www.actorsequity.org/NewsMedia/TakeAction/Feb14.4As.asp (Apr. 2, 2012) (listing theatres and
production company for which Equity members may not work).
297

298

Article X sec. 1 of the Actors Equity Bylaws provides:

“A member may be expelled, suspended, fined or otherwise disciplined for any of the
following offenses:
***
(d) engaging in any business, enterprise or activity which may directly or indirectly
conflict with the purposes or objects of the Association or any of its members, including
by way of example, work as a per former or stage manager in any form of theatre under
the jurisdiction of the Association without benefit of an Equity employment contract or
code, unless prior written consent by the Association has been granted.”
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All of these are concerted refusals to deal with those not given a preference.
Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n300 involved an antitrust action challenging, among other
things, the college draft provisions of the national basketball collective bargaining
agreement as an illegal horizontal agreement to eliminate competition for players'
services. The court held that the horizontal agreement was so clearly shielded by the
non-statutory exemption that it need not decide whether the draft was a per se violation
or subject to rule of reason analysis.301
The court likened the draft to a hiring hall arrangement:
"[C]ollective agreements in a number of industries provide for the exclusive referral of
workers by a hiring hall to particular employers at a specified wage. The choice of
employer is governed by the rules of the hiring hall, not the preference of the individual
worker. There is nothing that prevents such agreements from providing that the
employee either work for the designated employer at the stipulated wage or not be
referred at that time. Otherwise, a union might find it difficult to provide the requisite
number of workers to employers. Such an arrangement is functionally indistinguishable
from the college draft."302
In Genser v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,303 the district court held that a
hiring hall arrangement was shielded from antitrust liability by the non-statutory labor
exemption:

Actors Equity Bylaws art. X, sec. 1 & 1(d),
http://www.actorsequity.org/docs/about/AEA_ConstitutionBylaws.pdf.
See Mark D. Meredith, From Dancing Halls to Hiring Halls: Actors' Equity and the Closed Shop
Dilemma, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 178 (1996) (explaining and justifying Equity's role as a hiring hall, and
reviewing its evolution from a pre-entry closed shop to an operation allowing non-union actors to
audition). Id. at 182 (advocating extension1 of the immunity for closed shop hiring halls in the
construction industry under 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(f) to Actors Equity).
299
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809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
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809 F.2d at 959.
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809 F.3d at 960 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
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522 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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"The Seniority System is basically a ‘hiring hall.’ When an electrical contractor who is a
party to the Principal Agreement wishes to hire an additional electrician, he applies to
the System and the electrician with the greatest seniority is referred to him. Such a
System fills the legitimate labor objective of providing job security in a labor market
that is both highly mobile and subject to underemployment."304
In Associated General Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co.,305 the district court held that
hiring-hall arrangements are not prohibited closed-shop arrangements under section
14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act:306
"[A] greements that merely require an affiliation with a labor union, such as a nondiscriminatory, exclusive hiring-hall arrangement, do not come within § 14(b)‘s
exception to Board jurisdiction, for such an agreement does not require Membership in
a union."307
Other concerted refusals to deal do not involve hiring halls, but still protect the
collective bargaining process. In H. A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n,308
the Supreme Court considered whether Equity, the union for stage actors, violated the
antitrust laws by prohibiting its members from doing business with agents who did not
pay Equity a fee and agree to Equity's rules limiting agent compensation.
"The essential features of the regulatory scheme are identical: members are permitted to
deal only with agents who have agreed (1) to honor their fiduciary obligations by
avoiding conflicts of interest, (2) not to charge excessive commissions, and (3) not to
book members for jobs paying less than the union minimum. And as in Carroll, Equity's
regulation of agents developed in response to abuses by employment agents who
occupy a critical role in the relevant labor market. The agent stands directly between
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522 F. Supp. at 1160.
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457 F. Supp. 1207 (D ND 1978) (finding lack of standing in antitrust action).
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29 U.S.C. § 164(b).
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457 F. Supp. at 1217.
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451 U.S. 704 (1981).
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union members and jobs, and is in a powerful position to evade the union's negotiated
wage structure."309
The Court found that the practical realities of the theatre industry made it impossible
for Equity to defend the integrity of the minimum wage scale it negotiated with theatre
producers without regulating agency fees.310 It concluded, therefore, that the agents
were a "labor group" and that the agreement between Equity and the agents fell within
the statutory exemption.311 Equity's franchise system for agents essentially functioned as
a substitute for Equity's maintaining a hiring hall.312
Labor law circumscribes hiring hall arrangements, however. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
San Diego County District Council of Carpenters,313 the Supreme Court evaluated
carpenters’ picketing of Sears after the company refused to agree to limit its
employment of carpenters to those that had been dispatched from the union hiring
hall.314
“If an object of the picketing was to force Sears into assigning the carpentry work away
from its employees to Union members dispatched from the hiring hall, the picketing
may have been prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(D). Alternatively, if an object of the picketing
was to coerce Sears into signing a prehire or members-only type agreement with the
Union, the picketing was at least arguably subject to the prohibition on recognitional
picketing contained in § 8(b)(7)(C). "315

309

451 U.S. at 719-720.
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451 U.S. at 720.
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451 U.S. at 721.

312

451 U.S. at 721.

436 U.S. 180 (1978) (holding that a state-law action for trespass was not preempted by National Labor
Relations Act).
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436 U.S. at 182.
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436 U.S. at 185-186 [internal footnotes omitted].
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Outside the collective bargaining context, concerted refusals to deal are not likely to be
shielded by the labor exemptions, but they nevertheless may promote competition or
other aspects of social welfare sufficiently that they do not result in antitrust liability. 316

C.

Salary caps and other limitations on compensation of employees

Employers have an inherent interest in limiting their costs. Labor costs are an important
component of total costs in any entertainment industry. The possibility of the richest
employers bidding up the prices for stars is a phenomenon, not only of professional
sports, but also of the movie and theatre industries. Concerted restrictions on wage
levels reduce competition in the labor market and are thus subject to antitrust scrutiny
unless they are shielded by the labor exemption, or unless they pass muster under rule
of reason analysis, having escaped per se treatment. One possible justification for salary
caps is that they increase the possibility for weaker employers to attract stars—or at
least to conserve their resources in order to remain competitive with stronger
employers.317

D.

Employee mobility

In a competitive labor market employees are free to change jobs to seek better terms of
employment, and employers are free to try to hire employers of competitors. Firms
have an interest in restricting this mobility because, when the demand for labor exceed
the supply competition will lead to employer bidding up of wage rates, resulting in
higher labor costs. If an employer can contractually bind existing employees to continue
their services rather than seeking other jobs, they limit wage inflation.

See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), discussed supra, §
___ (approving horizontal arrangement for collective licensing of copyrights); Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.comm Inc., 127 Fed. Appx. 346 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction for
concerted refusal to deal; evidence showed competitive bidding and exclusive contracts with duration no
longer than six years); Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc., 131 Cal.Rptr.3d
519, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing district court and allowing discovery in state antitrust action by
single movie theatre alleging that exclusive film exhibition contracts violated rule of reason).
316

See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding salary cap,
among other restrictions valid under rule-of-reason analysis because it promoted maintenance of
competitive balance).
317
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Moreover, competitive labor markets present the risks that an employee with inside
knowledge of an employer practices, including but not limited to trade secrets, may
take that knowledge to a competitor. Covenants not to compete are common
mechanisms to reduce this risk.318
The reserve clause and the free-agent system in professional football represent
important limitations on athletes’ power to change teams, justified by the need to
promote competitive balance. If athletes were free to move around as they wished, they
could all flock to richer teams, leaving weaker teams unable to compete successfully.
Restrictions on "contract jumping"--the privilege of an employee to move from one
employer to another-- is a source of controversy for most entertainment industries.
Employers want to restrict movement; employees want to facilitate it.319
In Mackey v. National Football League,320 the court of appeals held that the Rozelle Rule321
violated the Sherman Act. It held that the non-statutory labor exemption did not apply
because the Rozelle Rule did not satisfy three criteria for pre-eminence of labor policy
over antitrust law:
1. The restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining
agreement;322
2. The agreement must concern a mandatory subject of bargaining; and

See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that covenants not to compete
that barred employees of subsidiary from being employed by seller of subsidiary satisfied antitrust rule
of reason; limitation was necessary to assure workforce continuity incident to corporate sale, and eightmonth restrict was not too broad).
318
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Robert C. Berry et al, Labor Relations in Professional Sports text accompanying n. 7.

320

543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).

"The Rozelle Rule essentially provides that when a player's contractual obligation to a team expires
and he signs with a different club, the signing club must provide compensation to the player's former
team. If the two clubs are unable to conclude mutually satisfactory arrangements, the Commissioner may
award compensation in the form of one or more players and/or draft choices as he deems fair and
equitable." 543 F.2d at 609 n.1.
321

543 F.2d at 614-615 (citing Connell Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters; Meat Cutters; Mine workers v.
Pennington).
322
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3. The agreement must be the product of bona-fide arm's-length bargaining.323
While the Rozelle Rule affected only the parties to the agreements and involved a
mandatory subject of bargaining, it did not involve bona fide arm's length bargaining,
because it had remained essentially unchanged since it was unilaterally imposed by the
teams in 1963.324
Because the labor exemption was unavailable, the court moved to application of
antitrust principles. Finding that per-se illegality was inappropriate,325 It agreed with
the district court's analysis of the anti-competitive effect of the Rule:
"the Rozelle Rule significantly deters clubs from negotiating with and signing free
agents; that it acts as a substantial deterrent to players playing out their options and
becoming free agents; that it significantly decreases players' bargaining power in
contract negotiations; that players are thus denied the right to sell their services in a free
and open market; that as a result, the salaries paid by each club are lower than if
competitive bidding were allowed to prevail; and that absent the Rozelle Rule, there
would be increased movement in interstate commerce of players from one club to
another."326
As to the alleged pro-competitive effects of the Rule, the court rejected the NFL
assertion of the Rule's necessity for maintenance of competitive balance within the
league:
"We need not decide whether a system of inter-team compensation for free agents
moving to other teams is essential to the maintenance of competitive balance in the
NFL. Even if it is, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the Rozelle Rule is
significantly more restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes it might
have in this regard. First, little concern was manifested at trial over the free movement
of average or below average players. Only the movement of the better players was
urged as being detrimental to football. Yet the Rozelle Rule applies to every NFL player
regardless of his status or ability. Second, the Rozelle Rule is unlimited in duration. It
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operates as a perpetual restriction on a player's ability to sell his services in an open
market throughout his career. Third, the enforcement of the Rozelle Rule is
unaccompanied by procedural safeguards. A player has no input into the process by
which fair compensation is determined. Moreover, the player may be unaware of the
precise compensation demanded by his former team, and that other teams might be
interested in him but for the degree of compensation sought."327
Employees retain more mobility in the theatre industry, where the need to promote
competitive balance is attenuated. For example, the master agreement between Actors
Equity and Chicago Area Theatres explicitly allows actors to accept "more remunerative
employment" from other productions, even when they are under contract to another
production.328

E.

Assuring a stream of new talent

In purely competitive labor markets, the transaction costs of matching employers with
employees (or independent contractors) can be high, especially when the markets are
regional or national in scope rather than local. Both buyers and sellers of labor have an
interest in such markets of supporting intermediaries that reduce the costs. Depending
on how the intermediation is structured, however, it may have anti-competitive effects
in product markets that go beyond what is necessary to improve labor market
efficiency.329
The draft system in professional football is intended, on the one hand, to assure
competitive balance by steering new talent to different teams equitably. But it also
serves the interests of new talent by establishing a transparent “hiring hall” in which all
players entering the professional sports arena are assured of visibility.330

543 F.2d at 622.
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Actors Equity CAT Rulebook Rule 36 (Sept. 2011),
http://www.actorsequity.org/docs/rulebooks/CAT_Rulebook_09-11.pdf.
328

An antitrust challenge by medical students to the mandatory residency match program was
interrupted by a federal statute giving the match program an exemtpion to the antitrust laws. See Jung v.
Association of American Medical Colleges, 339 F. Supp.2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2004) (describing claim and
legislation).
329
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See generally NFL Agreement Art. 6 (providing for and regulating team choices in "College Draft").
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In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,331 the court of appeals held that the draft 332 violated the
Sherman Act under rule-of-reason analysis. The NFL did not appeal the district court's
ruling that the labor exemption did not apply.333
It rejected the district court's conclusion that the draft constituted a group boycott, per
se illegal,334 and concluded that the draft differed from a classic group boycott:
"[The teams are] not Competitors in any economic sense. The clubs operate basically as
a joint venture in producing an entertainment product football games and telecasts. No
NFL club can produce this product without agreements and joint action with every
other team. To this end, the League not only determines franchise locations, playing

331

593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

"The NFL draft, which has been in effect since 1935, is a procedure under which
negotiating rights to graduating college football players are allocated each year among
the NFL clubs in inverse order of the clubs' standing. Under the draft procedures
generally followed, the team with the poorest playing-field record during the preceding
season has the first opportunity, as among the NFL teams, to select a college player of
its choice; the team with the next poorest record has the next choice, and so on until the
team with the best record (the winner of the previous year's “Super Bowl”) has picked
last. At this point, the first “round” of the draft is completed. In 1968 there were 16
succeeding rounds in the yearly draft, the same order of selection being followed in
each round. Teams had one choice per round unless they had traded their choice in that
round to another team (a fairly common practice). When Smith was selected by the
Redskins there were 26 teams choosing in the draft.
332

The NFL draft, like similar procedures in other professional sports, is designed to
promote ‘competitive balance.’ By dispersing newly arriving player talent equally
among all NFL teams, with preferences to the weaker clubs, the draft aims to produce
teams that are as evenly-matched on the playing field as possible. Evenly-matched
teams make for closer games, tighter pennant races, and better player morale, thus
maximizing fan interest, broadcast revenues, and overall health of the sport." 593 F.2d
at 1175-1176 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
593 F.2d at 1177 n.11. It found the labor exemption inapplicable because the draft was not the product
of collective bargaining and did not constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining. 420 F. Supp. at 742-743.
333

334
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593 F.2d at 1178; 593 F.2d at 1181 (rejecting per se analysis).

schedules, and broadcast terms, but also ensures that the clubs receive equal shares of
telecast and ticket revenues. These economic joint venturers ‘compete’ on the playing
field, to be sure, but here as well cooperation is essential if the entertainment product is
to attain a high quality: only if the teams are “competitively balanced” will spectator
interest be maintained at a high pitch. No NFL team, in short, is interested in driving
another team out of business, whether in the counting-house or on the football field, for
if the League fails, no one team can survive."335
The per-se prohibition of group boycotts is properly restricted to concerted attempts by
competitors to exclude horizontal competitors; it does not apply to concerted refusals to
deal aimed at some other goal.336
Under rule-of-reason analysis, the court accepted the district court's findings of severe
anti-competitive effect 337
"The draft inescapably forces each seller of football services to deal with one, and only
one buyer, robbing the seller, as in any monopsonistic market, of any real bargaining
power. The draft leaves no room whatever for competition among the teams for the
services of college players, and utterly strips them of any measure of control over the
marketing of their talents. The predictable effect of the draft . . . was to lower the salary
levels of the best college players. There can be no doubt that the effect of the draft as it
existed in 1968 was to suppress or even destroy competition in the market for players'
services."338
The court then proceeded to consider--and to reject--the pro-competitive justification
for the draft:
"The draft is procompetitive if at all, in a very different sense from that in which it is
anticompetitive. The draft is anticompetitive in its effect on the market for players'
services, because it virtually eliminates economic competition among buyers for the
services of sellers. The draft is allegedly procompetitive in its effect on the playing field;
but the NFL teams are not economic competitors on the playing field, and the draft,

335

593 F.2d at 1179.

336

593 F.2d at 1180

337

593 F.2d at 1183-1184.
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593 F.2d at 1185-1186 [internal quotations and citations omitted].

while it may heighten athletic competition and thus improve the entertainment product
offered to the public, does not increase competition in the economic sense of
encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the product at lower cost. . . . In
strict economic terms, the draft's demonstrated procompetitive effects are nil.”339
The court suggested alternatives that would have less anti-competitive effect:
"Without intimating any view as to the legality of the following procedures, we note
that there exist significantly less anticompetitive alternatives to the draft system which
has been challenged here. The trial judge found that the evidence supported the
viability of a player selection system that would permit more than one team to draft
each player, while restricting the number of players any one team might sign. A less
anticompetitive draft might permit a college player to negotiate with the team of his
choice if the team that drafted him failed to make him an acceptable offer. The NFL
could also conduct a second draft each year for players who were unable to reach
agreement with the team that selected them the first time. Most obviously, perhaps, the
District Court found that the evidence supported the feasibility of a draft that would
run for fewer rounds, applying only to the most talented players and enabling their
‘average’ brethren to negotiate in a ‘free market’ The least restrictive alternative of all, of
course, would be for the NFL to eliminate the draft entirely and employ revenuesharing to equalize the teams' financial resources a method of preserving ‘competitive
balance’ nicely in harmony with the league's self-proclaimed ‘joint-venture’ status."340
The court then remanded for consideration of damages.341
In the theatre and movie industries, the initial hiring process is less comprehensive.
Anyone may try out at an open audition, but only Equity Members and Equity
Candidates may participate in Equity-run auditions. The Equity agreement requires a
certain number of days of open auditions for Equity members and candidates, without
restricting auditions for non-equity members.342

593 F.2d at 1186-1187 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
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593 F.2d at 1187-1188 [internal footnotes omitted].
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593 F.2d at 1191.
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CAT Agreement Rule 5(B)(2).
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The movie industry has more explicit provisions to assure entry-level opportunity. The
SAG agreement has specific non-discrimination provisions to enhance casting
opportunities for disadvantaged groups, including the disabled and older actors343 It
also prohibits excluding actors without agents from auditions. 344

F.

Contracting out

In a perfectly competitive market, firms can decide whether to “make or buy.”345 Hiring
contractors to do the work that employees otherwise can do, however, obviously has an
adverse effect on present or potential employees. They have an interest in restricting
that competition between independent contractors and employees.
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,346 the Supreme Court agreed with the NLRB
that contracting out work previously performed by members of the bargaining unit
constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining.347 In First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB,348 however, the Supreme Court held that an employer has no duty under the
NLRA to bargain with a union over a decision to terminate a relationship with an
important customer and to close a part of its business. It distinguished pure business
decisions from decisions about employment conditions:
" The present case concerns a . . . type of management decision, . . . that had a direct
impact on employment, since jobs were inexorably eliminated by the termination, but
[also] had as its focus only the economic profitability of the contract with Greenpark, a
concern under these facts wholly apart from the employment relationship."349
The Court concluded that the harm to the employer's need to make a management
decision to shut down part of its business outweighed the incremental benefit of

343

SAG, 2005 Theatrical Agreement at Art. 26(a)(4) and (5).

344

Id. at Art. 26(a)6(b).

345

See discussion of Coase Theorem in § ___.

346

379 U.S. 203 (1964).

347

379 U.S. at 209.

348

452 U.S. 666 (1981).

349

452 U.S. at 676-677 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
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requiring bargaining with the union.350 It left undisturbed, however, the basic holding of
Fireboard and declined to express a view on whether other types of management
decisions such as subcontracting or automation might be subject to the duty to
bargaining.351

G.

Regulating channels for reaching audiences

In a perfectly competitive product market, competition exists at every stage of the
supply chain: each potential purchaser of goods or servers can compete to get the best
deal, and every potential seller of goods and services can compete for the business of
every purchaser. Exclusive distribution and supply arrangements are common,
however, in most industries. The entertainment industries are no exception.
In the movie industry, completing a movie does not ensure that anyone will ever see it.
Distribution and exhibition are necessary to connect movies with audiences. Major
studios perform not only production, but also distributions functions. The Paramount
decision352 prohibits them from also being in the exhibition business. Independent
producers, however, often contract with others for distribution. Because of the
importance of distribution to the capacity of a producer to pay actors and other
employees, the Screen Actors Guild ("SAG") agreement contains detailed regulations for
distribution enterprises and the agreements with them.353
In Flash Electronics, Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp.,354 independent
distributors of home videos and DVDs of movies and TV shows filed a Sherman Act
section 1 challenge against exclusive distribution contracts between the major movie
studios and the plaintiffs' competing distribution firms. The district court began its
analysis by noting that vertical restraints, such as one between movie studios and firms
that distribute their product to retailers typically are evaluated under the rule of reason

452 U.S. at 686.

350

452 U.S. at 686 n.22, citing Dan Dee West Virginia Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 534 (1970) (decision to change
method of distribution, under which employee-drivers became independent contractors).
351

352

United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).

Screen Actors Guild, 2005 Theatrical Agreement Art. 6,
http://www.sag.org/files/sag/2005TheatricalAgreement.pdf (responsibility for payments).
353

354
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312 F. Supp.2d 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).

rather than treated as per se violations.355 It noted the kinds of pro-competitive effects
that vertical deals can have:
"[V]ertical restrictions on intrabrand competition often have the procompetitive effect of
increasing interbrand competition in the relevant market. . . . Accordingly,
manufacturers should be given wide latitude in determining the profile of [their]
distributorships. Indeed, . . . absent a showing of price-fixing or an anticompetitive
effect on the market as a whole, run-of-the-mill exclusive distributorship agreements
are presumptively legal.”356
This is a less important issue in professional sports, where the teams and the leagues
directly perform marketing and organize games, or in the theatre industry, where a
production rarely proceeds beyond the script stage unless theatre space for
performance has already been arranged.

H.

Sharing new product-market revenue streams

Technology driven revolutions produce new sources of revenue for entertainment.
Whether and how to share those new revenue streams with employees is a frequent
source of controversy. The 2011 Television Decision357 forced the NFL to share additional
television revenues from its deal to protect itself from the adverse effects of a strike or
lockout. The 2007 strike by the Writers' Guild over shares of DVD and Internet revenue
for television shows and movies358 is another example. In 2011 a class action lawsuit
over collection and distribution of statutory royalties for sales of blank DVDs and tapes
was settled.359 The 2010 American Needle Supreme Court decision, discussed below,
involving licensing fees for sales of sports paraphernalia is yet another example.360
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312 F. Supp.2d at 386.
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312 F. Supp.2d at 386-387 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
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See §2.2[D].

Times Topics, N.Y. Times Feb. 10,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/w/writers_guild_of_america/index.h
tml
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See Screen Actors Guild, Notice, http://www.sag.org/notice.
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See generally Playing for Dollars at 58 (noting the increasing importance to football of licensing fees).
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The Safeway case, analyzed in § ___, observed that, under Citizen Publishing Co. v.
United States,361 revenue sharing arrangements usually are per-se antitrust violations. It
distinguished the strike-benefits provision in the case before it however, because of its
short-term nature and its limited overage, holding that it must be evaluated under the
rule of reason.362 It should also have included its obvious relationship to a labor dispute
as part of the rule of reason analysis, but it did not.
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,363 a case involving licensing of
intellectual property in sports paraphernalia, the Supreme Court rejected the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion that the NFL functioned as a "single entity" with respect to licensing
intellectual property.
“Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the market for intellectual property.
To a firm making hats, the Saints and the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers
of valuable trademarks. When each NFL team licenses its intellectual property, it is not
pursuing the common interests of the whole league but is instead pursuing interests of
each corporation itself; teams are acting as “separate economic actors pursuing separate
economic interests, and each team therefore is a potential independent center of
decisionmaking. Decisions by NFL teams to license their separately owned trademarks
collectively and to only one vendor are decisions that deprive the marketplace of
independent centers of decisionmaking, and therefore of actual or potential
competition."364
It remanded for rule of reason analysis of NFL exclusive licensing arrangements for
team logos and paraphernalia.365
The technological revolution impacts professional athletics by opening up new streams
of revenue for videogames and Internet fantasy sports involvement. College football
players have challenged, under the Sherman Act, the practice of colleges under NCAA

394 U.S. 131 (1969) (holding that profit pooling by competing newspapers constituted a per-se
violation of section 1).
361

362

651 F.3d at 1134-1136.

363

___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010).

364

130 S.Ct. at 2212-2213.
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130 S.Ct. at 2217.

rules to require college athletes to give colleges the exclusive power to license athlete
images and personal identifying information. 366

I.

Limiting competition by independent contractors

A competitive market for independent contractors threatens those with established
market positions in two ways: it undercuts employee wage standards when an
employer can get work done more cheaply by hiring independent contractors instead of
hiring or retaining employees; it also may undercut product-market position when the
independent contractors are firms rather than individuals active in the same product
market.
Three kinds of competitive restrictions on independent contracts arise to limit
competition. Unions may bargain for limitations on contracting out in collective
bargaining agreements. Firms may seek to exclude independent contractors from the
product market by making deals with customers or suppliers of essential factors of
production. The independent contractors themselves may seek to band together to limit
competition among themselves.
The general view is that independent contractors may not benefit from the labor
exemption by banding together and calling themselves a labor union.367 In Allied
Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,368 the Supreme Court reviewed
the evolution of the statutory definition of employee, noting that Congress had
amended the statute explicitly to exclude "independent contractors," after the Supreme
Court, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,369 agreed with the NLRB that newspaper street
vendors were statutory employees.370

See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. C 091967 CW, 2012 WL 1745593 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss Sherman Act complaint).
366

Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 102-103 (1962) (holding
that independent grease peddlers not immune from antitrust injunction requiring them to disband);
Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942) (holding that association of independent
fisherman who wanted to fix prices were not covered by labor exemption).
367

368

404 U.S. 157 (1971).
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, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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404 U.S. at 167.

The prohibition is not absolute, however:
"Even though a challenged combination includes independent contractors or
entrepreneurs, it may come within the statutory exemption if the non-employee parties
to the combination are in job or wage competition with the employee parties, or in some
other economic interrelationship that substantially affects the legitimate interests of the
employees.”371
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc.,372 already analyzed in § ___,
HBO filed an antitrust action against an association of freelance directors. The directors
defended based on the labor exemption. The district court decided that the statutory
exemption applied, because the directors qualified for employee, rather than
independent contractor status, and because they competed with salaried employees.373
In Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc.,374 the district court
determined that stage directors were entitled to labor exemption because they were
employees. The producer exercised control over every aspect of work. One with
experience in theatre might dispute the general validity of this assertion. In many
productions, the director is the boss.
In Ring v. Spina,375 the court determined that playwrights were not entitled to the labor
exemption:
"Here not only are the disputing parties not in an employer-employee relationship, but,
unlike the Allen Bradley case, the controversy cannot concern itself with conditions of
employment, since none of the parties affected are in any true sense employees. An
author writing a book or play is usually not then even in any contractual relation with
his producer. If and when he does contract, he does not continue in the producer's
service to any appreciable or continuous extent thereafter. Normally the author appears
more nearly like the fishermen entrepreneurs of the Hinton case or the doctors in the

Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 578, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)

371
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531 F. Supp. 578, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
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531 F. Supp. at 595 -597 [internal quotations and citations omitted].

374
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148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).

American Medical Association case than workmen banded together in a union. The
minimum price and royalties provided by the Basic Agreement, unlike minimum wages
in a collective bargaining agreement, are not remuneration for continued services, but
are the terms at which a finished product or certain rights therein may be sold. And no
wages or working conditions of any group of employees are directly dependent on
these terms. We think the exception therefore inapplicable."376
This line of cases suggests the following rules of thumb for combinations involving
persons nominally characterized as independent contractors: Some independent
contractors are shielded by the labor exemption if they are substitutes for employees.
Independent contractors who are truly independent, however, such as indie musicians,
independent theatre companies or producers, or indie movie-makers enjoy no labor
exemption.

J.

Controlling other labor-market intermediaries

The Supreme Court’s decision in H.A. Artists377 shielded collectively bargained
restrictions on booking agents in the theatre industry, finding that the union had a
legitimate interest in regulating agents in order to protect its wage bargain with
theatres. The NCAA has even more comprehensive regulations for sports agents,
outside the collective bargaining context. (College athletes are not employees, and thus
not entitled to engage in collective bargaining under the NLRA.)378
Rule-of-reason analysis is likely to validate such restrictions.379 Rules forbidding
payments to athletes and requiring athletes to attend class are necessary for the product
(college athletic contests) to exist at all.380 Regulation of agent payments to college
athletes can be justified as necessary to protect the more fundamental rules forbidding

148 F.2d at 652.

376

451 U.S. 704 (1981).
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See Blake Nielsen: Misconduct in Intercollegiate Sports: Inappropriate Benefits and Communications
Between Agents and Collegiate Athletes (2010),
http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/nielsen%20final%20sport%20agent.pdf, at 20-21
(discussing antitrust restrictions on NCAA).
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See generally Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
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134 F.3d at 1018.

payments to athletes. 381 The Tenth Circuit, however, found that NCAA limitations on
coaches' salaries did not survive "quick-look" rule of reason analysis because its adverse
effect on competition in the labor market for coaches outweighed its pro-competitive
effect.382

VI.

The revolution and the rule of law

The labor exemptions to the antitrust laws reflect a national policy that favors collectivebargaining. That national policy, in turn, is premised on the idea that employees lack
bargaining power vis-à-vis employers unless they band together. The concern about
disparate bargaining power is appropriate more broadly in the entertainment industries
as the technological revolution fragments production entities and blurs the distinction
between labor markets and product markets.
In many cases, the new, more atomized markets, will function just fine under
competition. Where that is the case aggressive antitrust enforcement is socially
beneficial. In other cases, production of the particular product requires restraints on
competition, and subsidies flowing from the richer firms to the poorer ones—the
professional football market. In large-scale sports, such arrangements and subsidies are
a mainstay. In other areas they are completely absent.
Exempting anticompetitive arrangements from the antitrust laws under the labor
exemption creates a counterpoise to the power of those who wish to limit competition:
it takes place in the matrix of collective-bargaining which guarantees a certain amount
of leverage in employee representatives. On the other hand, when rule-of-reason
analysis exempts a competitive constraint, there is no guarantee of a countervailing
force to police the anticompetitive arrangements.
Moreover, sny assessment of the operation of revolutionary labor markets in
entertainment is incomplete without considering what has become one of the most
powerful pools to suppress competition: overaggressive interpretation and enforcement
of copyright law.

See United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that NCAA eligibility
rules did not violate antitrust law in prosecution of sports agents for post-dating contracts with college
athletes to evade NCAA rules).
381
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134 F.3d at 1024.

A.

Implications for the future

As the Introduction pointed out, Internet-related technologies are likely to shift
controversies between workers and those hiring them from relatively certain territory
involving long-standing definitions of the labor exemptions, into less certain territory
where the boundaries of the exemptions must be tested. Technology also is likely to
push more controversies beyond the boundaries of the labor exemptions into antitrust
territory where the antitrust rule of reason will require balancing anti-competitive
effects against pro-competitive effects arising from the peculiar structural characteristics
of the particular industry sector.
1.

Entrepreneurship continuum

Two paradigmatic extremes illustrate the continuum along which the labor exemption
operates. At one extreme is a market in which individual performers—say performance
artists—band together to set theatre rental prices. At the other extreme is a market in
which the cast of a stage play bands together to insist on limits on rehearsal schedules.
2.

Trends in industry structures

The technological revolution has fragmented production systems in certain parts of the
entertainment industry, especially movies, popular music, and some aspects of
television, causing more of the coordination of inputs to take place through contracts
negotiated in markets and fewer to take place within firms. Technology has driven this
fragmentation in large part because it has reduced the barriers to entry.383

Compare Vogel at 15-17 (analyzing the traditionally high barriers to entry in entertainment industries)
with Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New architectures for music: Law Should Get Out of the Way, 29 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L. J. 259 (2007) (explaining how Internet and PC technologies have reduced barriers to
entry for musicians) and Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business Models for Music, 18 VILLANOVA SPORTS
& ENT. L. J. 63 (2010) (same) and Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for
Movies, 10 VIRGINIA SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 106 (2010) (same for moviemakers).
383
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The AFL/CIO is adapting to these changes in labor markets by launching an initiative
focused on jobs that do not fit the traditional model of full-time, long-term, attachment
of employees to one employer. 384
The “Coase Theorem” postulates that a firm’s decision whether to produce an input
internally, with resources such as employees bound to it over the course of time, or
externally, with contracts negotiated at arms’ length in the marketplace—often referred
to as a “make or buy” decision-- is driven by the relative efficiency (cost) of the
alternative approaches.385
Internet-linked technologies have increased the relative efficiency of much work being
performed outside traditional physical workplaces.386 The Coase Theorem accurately
predicts that this causes the boundaries of firms to contract and for a greater share of
labor to be performed under independent contracts rather than through employment
relationships. This trend is particularly pronounced in the popular-music387 and video
entertainment industries.388 Fewer musicians reach their markets through long-term
deals with record labels rather than proceeding independently and finding audiences
through the Internet. The studio system for producing Hollywood movies is long dead,
and the current trend is to look to independent moviemakers for more of the content to
be distributed through new channels.
All of this results in fragmentation of both product and labor markets. More, smaller,
units of production are becoming the norm. Fragmentation makes concerted action
more difficult because it increases the transaction costs of organizing anti-competitive

Presentation by Richard Trumka, President of AFL/CIO at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Oct. 6, 2011
(citing as examples taxi drivers and domestic workers).
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See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937); Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs,
Joint-Venture Analysis After American Needle, 7 J. Competition L. & Reg. 543, 548 & n.29 (2011)
(criticizing American Needle's analysis of single entity in antitrust law; referring to Coase Theorem)
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See Mirian A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 951 (2011) (assessing implications
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ENT. L. J. 106 (2010)
388

89

arrangements in the first place and of policing them once they have been established.389
Entertainment-industry unions know this. Thus the AFM makes no effort to unionize
indie rock bands, Actors Equity makes no effort to pressure store-front theatres (except
to restrict their use of Equity Actors), and AFSCME and SAG mostly ignore the indie
movie phenomenon.
The popularity of reality television shows has created stress on traditional scope of
union representation and the FLSA artist exemption.390
Technology is less likely to cause changes in the industry structure for professional
football, but the technological revolution is likely to set off battles over ownership of
new revenue streams for professional sports. For example, fan capture and re-broadcast
of live games is both increasingly feasible and of uncertain status under copyright,
trademark and right-of-publicity doctrines.391
Whether a "guerrilla" making and distributing a video recording of a live football
would infringe copyright is an interesting question. In Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n,392 the court of appeals suggested that a game itself is not
copyrightable, but that as soon as it is recorded, as it usually is by those with explicit
broadcast rights, the fixation element would be satisfied and the performance of the
game, and not only the audiovisual work would be copyrighted. The court's analysis of
the question, related as it was, to a finding of preemption of player publicity rights in
the game, and related to its earlier emphasis on the creative originality of the authorized
video capture resulting in the audio visual work, casts doubt on the robustness of its
conclusion.
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See Dryer v. National Football League, 689 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D. Minn. 2010) (denying motion for
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805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).

National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc.,393 involved a claim that display of
blacked out football games by bar owners infringed copyright. The court of appeals
agreed with the district court that it was the football game itself--"the game action, the
noncommercial elements of the game" that constituted the work of authorship, fixed
when it was broadcast by cable to non-blacked out areas.394 The defendants claimed that
they copied no protected elements because they stripped out commentary and
advertisements, reproducing, distributing and performing only the game itself. 395 "The
fixation, therefore, is the “original ‘works' of authorship” which is the opera, the dance
ensemble, the address and the game. The fact that the performance is replete with
network commercial insertions does not so restructure the program as to make it a new
original work or to give it a new or final fixation,"396 the district court had said.
These are questionable conclusions, in light of the copyright act’s explicit conclusion
that facts are not copyrightable397 and the Supreme Court’s holding in Feist398 that the
“sweat of the brow” expended in making facts available does not make the facts—as
opposed to selection and arrangement—copyrightable. Live football games are facts.
New technologies also are opening up new revenue opportunities. In professional
sports the growth in fantasy football has been enabled by the Internet, and is a potential
source of revenue for players and teams.399 Similarly, more sophisticated video games
feature celebrities of all kinds, including college and professional athletes, resulting in a
new stream of revenue the celebrities are eager to tap.
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3.

Doctrinal accommodation

One way to deal with the antitrust problem for the lower strata is to think harder about
impact on interstate commerce, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision on the
healthcare reform act,400 which suggests that for legislation to be valid, federal
legislation must persuasively link small-scale conduct to interstate commerce.401 The
impact of a storefront theatre production on interstate commerce is quite small.
Exhibition of an indie movie on the Internet, however, obviously involves interstate
commerce, because the Internet is global in its reach. Storefront theatre, garage bands,
YouTube content producers, and indie moviemaking have minimal direct impact on
interstate commerce, however, unlike concert tours by Linkin Park, a Chicago Bears
football game, the Broadway production of Death of a Salesman, or the opening of the
Avengers. But that won't solve the problem of state competition law.
4.

Areas of possible conflict
a)

Likely conflicts

Indie musicians could organize to put pressure on performance venues to agree to
minimum terms for public performances by indie musicians and bands. It is unlikely
that such concerted action would qualify for either labor exemption. Indie musicians do
not look like employees under the well-established tests, and they would be hard
pressed to argue that the purchase of their services by venues qualifies as a labor
market, as contrasted with a product market. Nevertheless, it is true that venues
wanting to provide their customers with live music can either hire musicians as
employees or retain the services of indie musicians. In this sense the relevant market is
a labor market.
Actors and production crafts could band together to put pressure on theatres and movie
production companies to guarantee a certain number of slots for early-career-state
personnel. The Equity agreements already seek to open up opportunities for new talent
in specific categories, especially the disabled. If such efforts to accommodate new talent
are part of the collective bargaining process, it almost certainly is exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. Likewise, if the new talent acts in concert in non-union sectors of the movie

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, --- S.Ct. ----, No. 11-400, 2012
WL 2427810 (June 28, 2012).
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Id. at *20.

and theatre industries, exemption from antitrust liability also is likely depending on the
craft; actors and directors look like employees under the traditional tests; writers,
producers, lighting and sound designers, and set designers look more like independent
contractors. Cinematographers fall somewhere in between, especially on indie
productions.
Itinerant theatre companies could band together to achieve more favorable terms from
performance spaces renting theatre space. Exemption is unlikely because even the
poorest theatre company is a business rather than an individual offering labor services.
Any rule-of-reason argument would have to establish the pro-competitive effect of
assuring the survival of independent theatre.
Indie movie producers could band together to put pressure on distribution companies,
including new Internet distribution firms, to achieve access. Eligibility for a labor
exemption is unlikely because indie movie producers, like itinerant theatre companies,
look like firms rather than individuals. They also could band together to license such
movies to major content providers such as iTunes, Amazon, YouTube, and Vimeo, and
to social networks such as MySpace. The problem here is that no labor market is
involved. Producers of indie movies are classic businessmen; as independent
contractors, they do not substitute for employees and compete with them; they compete
with and hope to substitute for larger movie producers. The pro-competitive argument
would be stronger however, if Amazon, iTunes, Hulu, and social networks begin to
strike more deals providing exclusivity or especially favorable terms to large studios.
Retired professional football players could break with the Players Association and
organize a separate concerted effort to bargain with teams over retiree benefits. In Allied
Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,402 the Supreme Court,
disagreeing with the Board, held that retirees are not statutory employees, and therefore
that the benefits of already-retired persons are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 403
This makes application of a labor exemption unlikely. The retirees also would be hardpressed to marshal a pro-competitive argument under the rule of reason because they
are no longer competing in either product or labor markets.

404 U.S. 157 (1971).

402

403

404 U.S. at 168.
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The Players Association could band together to license player images and personalities
to fantasy football providers or video game developers providers. The problem here is
that the market for player publicity rights is not a labor market; it is a product market.
Already, the commercial importance of new forms of media providing fans access to
sports celebrities is generating controversy. In Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,404 the district
court denied a motion to dismiss a right-of-publicity claim by a former college football
player against a video-game producer. Taking the facts alleged in the plaintiff's
pleading as true, the court found:
"In the game, the quarterback for Arizona State University shares many of Plaintiff's
characteristics. For example, the virtual player wears the same jersey number, is the
same height and weight and hails from the same state. . . . EA does not depict Plaintiff
in a different form; he is represented as he what he was: the starting quarterback for
Arizona State University. Further, . . . the game's setting is identical to where the public
found Plaintiff during his collegiate career: on the football field."405
The district court granted a stay pending appeal of related cases.406
In Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,407 the district court dismissed an action by a college
football player against a video game developer for violating his state-law right of
publicity. The player alleged that a player in the video game had the same height,
weight, jersey number, type of wrist band, and helmet visor as the actual player, also
using statistics on playing success identical to those of the actual player.408 Because the
specific similarities were not pleaded, the court dismissed with leave to file a second
amended complaint setting forth the specific similarities.409
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No. 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
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Id. at *5.

See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 5644656
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010).
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740 F. Supp.2d 658 (D. N.J. 2010).
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In the Keller case and in a related case, O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,410
college football and basketball players claimed that the NCAA violated the antitrust
laws by requiring college athletes to authorize the NCAA to use their names and
likenesses to promote NCAA activities and to relinquish their rights to the commercial
use of their images.411 Such requirements, the athletes claimed, excluded them from the
collegiate licensing market. Denying a motion to dismiss, the district court held that the
plaintiffs had pleaded an agreement that restrained competition,412 and that he made
out a case under the rule-of-reason.413 A multi-district panel in California reached a
similar conclusion. 414
As the market for new technologies to exploit the popularity of entertainment-industry
celebrities builds, the likelihood of antitrust scrutiny of collective licensing
arrangements415 will intensify. Because the licensing market is a product market, not
linked at all directly to any labor market, application of the labor exemption is unlikely,
but rule-of-reason analysis may nevertheless privilege the arrangements.
b)

New sports revenue streams

Although the technological revolution is not likely to have much impact on labor
markets in professional sports, it has already had profound impact on product markets.
The first battleground focused on television broadcasts, as exemplified by the Supreme
Court’s decision in NCAA, considered in § ___, and the separate lawsuit filed by the
NFL Players Association over television revenues during the 2011 lockout. 416
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No. C 09-3329, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
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Id. at *1 (summarizing allegations).
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Id. at *4.
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See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. C 091967 CW, 2012 WL 1745593 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss Sherman Act complaint).
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Collective licensing of any rights enhances market efficiency by reducing transaction costs for both
rights holders and licensees. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cut in Tiny Pieces: Ensuring that Fragmented
Ownership Does Not Chill Creativity, 14 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH.L.1, ___ (2011) (reviewing economics and
caselaw for copyright collectives).
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See § ___.

Copyright protection for football games and other athletic contests, at least when the
games are captured on video, gives the leagues and teams a strong lever to control
exploitation of revenue potential from broader electronic distribution of actual games
through the Internet. Fantasy sports and videogames, however, need not use actual
game footage. As to them, leverage is available only under a common-law or statutory
“right of publicity.”417
Fantasy sports418 is rapidly growing, with nearly $1 billion in annual revenues.419
"[F]antasy football” refers to a game in which participants simulate management
responsibilities of the roster of a NFL team by, among other things, (1) scouting,
drafting, and trading players on their teams; (2) adding and dropping players; and (3)
otherwise manipulating the team's roster over the course of the season-long
competition. To facilitate the competition among the participants in a given fantasy
football league, the standard fantasy football game utilizes the actual statistics
generated by NFL players during the course of the regular season."420 The NFL has
embraced fantasy football to the extent that it has a link on its website.421 No similar link
exists for videogames.
The professional sports leagues, teams, and players naturally have an interest in
tapping some of this revenue—or, less progressively, in trying to shut it down because

See Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp.2d 757, 772-774 (D.N.J. 2011) (reviewing history of
common-law right and referring to state statutes; granting summary judgment to video-game developer
on First Amendment grounds in right-of-publicity action brought by former college football player)
417
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fantasy_sport

See Anthony Crupi, Billion Dollar Draft Some 27 million Americans play fantasy football—and media
companies are cashing in on their obsession, Adweek, http://www.adweek.com/news/advertisingbranding/billion-dollar-draft-136370 (reporting nearly $1 billion in revenues for fantasy football in 2010).
419

CBS Interactive Inc. v. National Football Players Ass'n, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 398, 403 (D. Minn. 2009)
(describing phenomenon) [internal citations omitted].
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See http://www.nfl.com/fantasyfootball.

of a fear that it drain market share from the activities of the leagues. The NFL Players
Association claims exclusive group licensing rights for players’ rights of publicity.422
In C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,423 the
court of appeals held that a provider of fantasy baseball games could use baseball
players' names and statistics without violating their right of publicity and, moreover,
had a First Amendment right to use them.424 In CBS Interactive Inc. v. National Football
Players Ass'n, Inc.,425 the district court applied the Eighth Circuit holding to fantasy
football, holding that use of football player identities is protected by the First
Amendment.426 The state of the law on this question is, however, unsettled.427 In Dryer
v. National Football League,428 however, the district court distinguished actual video
footage of football players from the data used in fantasy football, and denied a motion
for summary judgment on First Amendment grounds in a class action brought by
former professional football players against the the NFL for using promotional video
footage of them playing.429
Significantly, for purposes of this article, the fantasy sports producers claimed antitrust
monopolization by the NFLPA.430

CBS Interactive, 259 F.R.D at 402-403 (explaining NFLPA licensing activites covering individual
players' names, signatures, facsimile, voices, pictures, photographs, likenesses, and biographical
information).
422

505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.2007).
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505 F.3d at 824 (explaining why interests usually advanced to support right of publicity do not apply
to professional athletes who already are handsomely compensated).
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CBS Interactive, 259 F.R.D. at 413-414 (noting Florida district court case and commentary disagreed
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CBS Interactive, 259 F.R.D. at 412 (dismissing, under Noerr Pennington doctrine, claim that
enforcement efforts violated antitrust law).
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The Congress has granted fantasy sports an exemption on prohibitions against Internet
gambling in Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006,431 by excluding
fantasy sports from the definition of "bet or wager."432
Videogames based on professional sports teams and players also are proliferating. 433
The legal issues are the same regarding videogames as for fantasy sports.
As the technological revolution continues, controversies over who is entitled to make
money from the celebrity of professional athletes surely will grow.
c)

Ticketing and concert venue monopolies

The Internet increases economies of scale for sales of tickets to entertainment events,
and increases economies of scope for linking ticket sales to exhibition of the related
events. One result was the merger of Ticketmaster with Live Nation, approved by
United States Department of Justice in 2010.434
The dominance of such intermediaries naturally leads to controversies over
monopolization and commercial relations.435
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31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367.
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Justice Department Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Requires Ticketmaster Entertainment
Inc. to Make Significant Changes to Its Merger with Live Nation Inc.,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-at-081.html (Jan. 25, 2010) (requiring, as condition of
merger approval, licensing of ticketing software, divestiture of ticketing assets and anti-retaliation
provisions).
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See, e.g. McMillan v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., 2012 Ark. 166, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2012) (answering
certified question as to whether claim that Ticketmaster fees exceeded ticket price violated state statute
prohibiting excessive fees); Live Nation Worldwide, Inc. v. Hillside Productions, Inc., ___ F. Supp.2d ___,
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d)

Enforcing the law against new threats

Regardless of theoretical analysis of liability when entertainment-industry participants
limit new forms of competition enabled by the technological revolution, passivity or
impracticability in enforcing the law is likely to leave large arenas available for
participants to do as they please.
The reality is that the Labor Department doesn't enforce the FLSA against the small
players, and neither is the Internal Revenue Service very aggressive about challenging
independent-contractor classifications.
If they're all employees, they are entitled a minimum wage, unemployment
compensation, and workers comp. There are, of course, some carveouts for part time
and casual employment, and—importantly--for actors and writers.436
Nor is trade unionism likely to be a particularly effective means for limiting
competition. As § ___, explains the transaction costs of establishing and enforcing anticompetitive arrangements becomes too high when the units of production are
fragmented, and that is precisely the effect that technology is having. Even fairly large
movies – those with budgets in the range of $2 million-$10 million, as a very rough
approximation, use lots of freelance labor. In theater, Actors Equity only penetrates
approximately 10 to 15%, measured by number of productions, although the figure
would be much higher measured by percentage of total audience. AFSCME and SAG
have little sway in indie movie production. The AFM is perhaps the strongest example,
when one looks at the full range of musical performances and music recording activity
in an urban area. The AFM does community service work for all musicians but attempts
to organize the smaller entities and fluid groups of musicians are unknown
The reality is that many of the producing entities are simply not on anyone's radar
screen. In some cases they're not formal business entities, but sole proprietorship or,
common-law partnerships. Even in those cases when they have registered as
corporations or LLCs, there are too many of them for any trade union to organize them
cost effectively. So the unions do not try.
And any rational administrative agency is going to set enforcement priorities. It's hard
to conceive of a rational enforcement strategy that would devote significant resources to
targeting the low-end.
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See § ___, supra.

So: the result is a formal regime that bears little resemblance to the actual structure of
labor markets in the entertainment industry.
And reality is that the enforcement strategies of administrative agencies in the labor
field have always influenced heavily by what trade unions think is important. So what
will trade unions think it is important? Equity, SAG/AFTRA, and the AFM are
reasonably strong unions. So are the AFL Players Association and its counterparts in
other sports
Some ideas can be gleaned from tensions between union and nonunion construction,
union and nonunion trucking, heavily unionized and nonunion or only partially
unionized airlines.
And all of these cases the threat to collectively bargain labor standards and union
security appeared not in the form of new labor market phenomena (contracting out
being a notable exception); rather it appeared in the form of new product market
competition.
So where is this most likely in the entertainment industry? It is not at all likely in
professional football. The notion that arena football could begin to steal market share
from the NFL is ludicrous. On the other hand, newly rising sports like soccer could
begin to gain market share at the expense of other sports, making it a threat.
In music, the product market transformation probably is too far gone for the union
movement to do anything about it. The recording industry is still clinging on to some
established celebrities, but the relationship between artists and recording studios has
never been understood to be an employment relationship. 437 That means that the AFM
has no beachhead from which to operate with respect to recorded music.
Likewise in theater, although the much greater audience drawing power of larger
equity theaters compared with smaller storefront theaters is so profound and the
migration from the lower stratum for the higher strata is so much a part of the ambition
of actors and other theater people that something like the current market structure is
likely to persist
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But see ABA Journal article about recapture of copyrights.
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It is in video entertainment for the changes are likely to be most dramatic. The
possibility for crowd sourcing of important functions in moviemaking,438 the entry of
new Internet-oriented entities like Amazon, Google, Hulu, and Netflix, the ease with
which truly indie moviemakers can use the same tools now being embraced by the large
players to distribute video entertainment product all portend significant turmoil in the
years to come as the technological revolution continues
It always has been the case that the establishment uses every tool at its disposal – labor
law, antitrust law, aggressive business and litigation credit strategies--to crush or at
least defer the success of new entrants using new business models.
It will do so this case, also.
5.
Contraction of the labor exemption and more rule-of-reason
analysis
When no labor union is involved, the scope of the labor exemption is extremely small:
the core policy underpinning both exemptions is the public-policy decision to promote
collective bargaining. When there is no collective bargaining to regulate the labor
market, and no prospect of its coming into existence, defenders of an anti-competitive
arrangement are hard-pressed to argue that a labor exemption is available. If an
employment relationship must be the “matrix of the controversy” for an exemption to
be available, and less of the commerce occurs through employment relationships, the
operation of the exemptions diminishes.
That means that more business arrangements that allegedly interfere with competition
are subject to antitrust analysis. In dealing with its increasing inventory of disputes,
antitrust law must balance certain fundamental marketplace realities:


economies of scale--ISPs, social networks, web search, movie and music portals



aggregation of capital and cross subsidization

pitted against

See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for Movies, 10 VIRGINIA SPORTS &
ENT. L. J. 106, ___ (2010) (discussing crowd sourcing as movie production strategy to reduce costs); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Crowd Sourcing for Moviemaking (forthcoming).
438
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desire of fading establishments to throw up barriers to new, more efficient,
competitors



desire of artists to be able to support themselves with their art
6.

Two hypothetical scenarios

Two closely related fictional scenarios help integrate the analysis of the types of
disputes likely to arise in the entertainment industries under pressure from the
technological revolution.439
Amory Richards is a young cinematographer employed by Walt Disney Studios. He is
represented by the International Cinematographers Guild, part of the International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (“IATSE”), of which he is a member. A collective
bargaining agreement covers his employment.
Selnick Edwards is a young video editor employed by the production division of
Comcast. The National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians
(“NABET”), part of the Communications Workers of America (“CWA”) represents
Comcast video editors but Selnick has elected not to become a member, electing instead
to pay an agency fee to the union under an agency-shop agreement. A collective
bargaining agreement covers Selnick’s employment with Comcast.
Amory and Selnick studied filmmaking at Columbia College in Chicago with Kendrick
Marshall. Kendrick has entered into an agreement with a recent graduate of ChicagoKent College of Law, Andrew Zeer to produce Andrew’s screenplay, No Fun League.
Kendrick has worked out a shot list and shooting schedule and is ready to begin
principal photography. He contacts Amory and asks him to be the cinematographer.
Amory is excited and agrees to take part in the project “on spec;” i.e. he won’t get paid
anything unless the movie makes money. If it does, he will get 5% of the net profits.
Kendrick makes a similar deal with Selnick to be the editor of No Fun League
Disney has heard about No Fun League and is quite worried that it will dilute the
audience for Disney’s new blockbuster, Mouseketeers Retreaded Again, featuring Justin
Timberlake, Keri Russell, and Ryan Gosling. The budget for Mouseketeers Retreaded
Again is $200 million. The budget for No Fun League is $75,000. Disney figures that No
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Fun League will never get made if Marshall has to pay Amory the same compensation he
is entitled to from Disney.
The cinematographers are concerned about the impact on their wage levels. They also
understand that if the market for Disney's movie is reduced that that will undermine
employment opportunities. Disney communicates its fear to the cinematographers. The
cinematographers pick up the ball. The tell Disney to fire Amory, and tell him it will
expel him and make sure Disney fires him if he works for Kendrick for any less than
Disney pays him.
Comcast is likewise worried that No Fun League will prove so popular that Comcast
subscribers will drop their subscriptions and flock to see No Fun League on the Internet,
paying for it through their Amazon accounts. It tells Selnick that he will be fired if he
works for Kendrick for any less than he is paid by Comcast.
What legal claims might Amory and Selnick have against Disney, the
Cinematographers Guild, Comcast or NABET? How strong are they?
In order to determine whether Amory, Selnick, or Marshall could recover against the
IATSE, Disney, or Comcast, one must understand (1) whether the conduct they object to
is exempt from antitrust law, (2) whether it would survive rule-of-reason scrutiny if it is
not exempt, (3) whether any of them have antitrust standing, and whether the conduct
constitutes a secondary boycott under the NLRA.
Plaintiffs could argue that neither the actions of the IATSE or Disney fall within the
statutory exemption provided by the Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia, nor the nonstatutory labor exemption created by the judiciary. Thus, if they have standing, Amory
and Marshall would be in a strong position to prevail against IATSE and Disney for
violating the Sherman Act by colluding with each other to restrain trade.
In the case at hand, there are two ways Amory's activity could negatively impact the
wages of union employees at Disney: (1) the union's bargaining position could be
weakened, eventually driving down the wages of union members; (2) the success of No
Fun League could increase competition in the product market, thereby driving down
Disney's revenue and, eventually, the wages and even job security of union members.
Protecting the union’s bargaining position is a legitimate objective that fails the rule of
reason test.
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The IATSE would argue that its action to prevent Amory from working for Marshall at
anything less than Disney standards falls within the exemption because it is necessary
to protect its collectively bargained standards. Amory is not likely to be unique: if he is
willing to work for Marshall for less than his compensation at Disney, others will do the
same thing—for Marshall and others like him. Disney could reduce its costs by laying
off its employees, including Amory, and hiring Marshall and others like him to do their
work. Any employer wants to buy labor at the lowest possible price. Without a wage
floor, competition between potential employees will drive down wages—at least when
the labor supply exceed the demand. Preventing that is the central goal of collective
bargaining. Thus, if a large number of workers on the job market seek to work below
union wages, Disney could replace union employees with the cheaper alternatives.
Seeking to maintain this form of “uniformity of labor standards” is a “legitimate aim” of
the IATSE. It thus appears that this side agreement is subject to the nonstatutory labor
exemption.
If, however, it is found that the antitrust laws do apply, the question becomes whether
the IATSE’s side agreement with Amory is a per se violation or, if not, whether it passes
the rule of reason. Non-compete agreements between employers and their employees
are not per se violations of the Sherman Act.440 A non-compete agreement prohibits an
employee of one company from working for a competitor under any conditions. It
follows fortiori that a less stringent agreement between an employer and an employee
(such as the one between Disney and Amory) that prohibits an employee from working
for a competitor if certain conditions are not met is also not a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.
While the IATSE’s side agreement with Amory may not be a per se violation of the
Sherman Act, it is a violation under the rule of reason. [the introduction did not say
that the analysis would cover the rule of reason, but it should]Large production
companies like Disney can afford to pay more to their employees than can their
independent competitors. Allowing unions to forbid members from working below the
high standards set by these companies would risk putting independent production
companies out of business. Such a result would have a devastating effect on the

Id. at 1137 (explaining that non-compete agreements are “a common feature of countless independent contractor
relationships in any number of industries” and does not constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Eichorn v.
AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 144-147 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that non-compete agreements that are reasonable in
scope do not violate antitrust laws under the rule of reason).
440
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competitive nature of the product market. The benefit provided to the union
(strengthened bargaining position) does not outweigh the harm caused to independent
producers (elimination).
Decreasing competition in the product market in order to protect the labor market is not
a legitimate objective; even if it were, it fails the rule of reason test.
Plaintiffs would argue that IATSE does not have the power to stay within the labor
exemption while preventing the impact that No Fun League’s financial success would
have on union wages. While a union's direct activities on the labor market may have an
indirect impact on the product market, any activity taken by a union to impact the
product market directly constitutes an illegitimate objective that is not exempt from
antitrust law.
Plaintiffs would argue that the IATSE could prevent harm to union wages due to
increased competition in the product market only by actually limiting competition in
the product market. In this case, it is known that Amory is essential to the existence of
Disney's competitor in the product market (i.e., No Fun League). IATSE's conduct
would not be exempt from antitrust law if it intended to shut down No Fun League by
making Amory unaffordable.
Even if IATSE’s objective were legitimate IATSE’s conduct would not pass the rule of
reason. Once again, the minor benefit such side agreements would have on the labor
market does not outweigh the potentially "significant adverse effects on the market and
on consumers-effects unrelated to the union's legitimate goals of organizing workers
and standardizing working conditions."441
The side agreement between Comcast and Selnick requires a simpler analysis. Comcast
is a non-labor organization seeking to negotiate with a member of a labor group (e.g.,
Selnick) for the sole purpose of manipulating the product market. Thus, as with
Amory, Plaintiff’s would argue that Comcast’s objective is illegitimate and does not
pass the rule of reason.

union’s attempt to force contractor to not subcontract
work to firms that did not already have a contract with the union is not exempt from antitrust
laws because “it contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congressional labor
policy”)
441

Connell Const. Co., Inc at 624 (holding that
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While a union's direct activities on the labor market may have an indirect impact on the
product market, any activity taken by a union to impact the product market directly
constitutes an illegitimate objective that is not exempt from antitrust regulations
As with IATSE, even if Comcast had a legitimate objective, its conduct would not pass
the rule of reason. Once again, the minor benefit such side agreements would have on
the labor market does not outweigh the potentially "significant adverse effects on the
market and on consumers-effects unrelated to the union's legitimate goals of organizing
workers and standardizing working conditions."442
Simply establishing an agreement that falls outside the exemptions and fails rule-ofreason analysis, however, is not enough to allow Amory, Selnick, or Marshall to recover
for the antitrust violation; they also much have standing. Amory, Selnick, and Marshall
are going to have a hard time establishing standing to sue for antitrust violations. The
class of plaintiffs capable of establishing antitrust standing is limited to consumers and
competitors in the restrained market.443
CBC Companies, Inc. v. Equifax, Inc.444 involved Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 claims
against Equifax for hiking the fees it imposed on the plaintiff for reselling Equifax credit
data. The plaintiff claimed monopolization and attempted monopolization of the
market for credit reports sold to mortgage lenders.445 The court of appeals agreed with
the district court that the plaintiff had failed to plead antitrust injury. "To prove
antitrust injury, the key inquiry is whether competition-not necessarily a competitorsuffered as a result of the challenged business practice. One competitor may not use the
antitrust laws to sue a rival merely for vigorous or intensified competition. . . . An
antitrust plaintiff [must] demonstrate that the alleged violation tended to reduce
competition overall and that the plaintiff's injury was a consequence of the resulting
diminished competition."446 Although the complaint alleged that the plaintiff and other
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West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 102 (3d Cir. 2010) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant in part and holding that an agreement with the dominant hospital artificially to
depress prices paid by a monopsonist health insurer by the second hospital established antitrust injury).
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resellers were the principal victims of Equifax's conduct, it "never identifies any of these
other resellers, and never establishes whether any of these resellers signed a contract
similar to the Reseller Agreement.”447 "Essentially, CBC disagrees with the price terms
of the contract that Equifax proposed and CBC later signed. But even where a business
carries a significant portion of the market share, antitrust law is not a negotiating tool
for a plaintiff seeking better contract terms. Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not give
plaintiffs the exclusive right to dictate the terms on which they will deal, nor does it
require the defendant to accede to every demand of the plaintiffs. "448
That means that Amory and Selnick cannot establish antitrust standing merely by
showing that they, as individuals, were deprived of the opportunity to sell their
services to Marshall; they would have to show that the conduct by Disney, Comcast,
and the unions reduced competition in the market for indie cinematographers and
editors generally and that they were injured as a result. Likewise, Marshall cannot
establish antitrust injury unless he pleads and proves that the conduct diminished
competition in the movie production market and that he was injured as a result.
Sterling Merchandising, Inc. v. Nestle, S.A.449 involved Sherman Act sections 1 and 2
claims against the dominant supplier of ice cream in Puerto Rico for its acquisition of a
distributor that competed with the plaintiff and its subsequent pricing and contracting
policies. The plaintiff was dependent on the defendant for its most popular brand of ice
cream. The court of appeals, agreeing with the district court, held that the plaintiff
failed to show, at the summary judgment stage, antitrust injury, because the evidence
showed that the plaintiff’s market share and profits had increased during the period of
the allegedly illegal conduct and that the defendant continued to make ice cream
available to it. The plaintiff argued that it would have done even better but for the
defendant's conduct, but the court found evidence supporting that proposition
unpersuasive:
"The lack of evidence of antitrust injury in the form of either increased consumer prices
or reduced output is consistent with the lack of evidence that Sterling itself has been
negatively affected by Nestlé PR's purported violations. It is axiomatic that antitrust
laws are concerned with protecting against impairments to a market's competitiveness
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561 F.3d at 572.
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561 F.3d at 573 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
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656 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2011).
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and not impairments to any one market actor. It is also true that an antitrust plaintiff's
post-violation successes do not necessarily preclude compensation for damages
proximately caused by an antitrust violation. Nonetheless, that Sterling's sales, profits,
and market share have increased during the relevant period provides further indication
that no antitrust injury exists here."450
That suggests that Amory, Selnick, and Marshall could establish antitrust injury only if
they offered evidence that competition in the movie production market and in the
markets for indie cinematographers and editors was declining, resulting in declining
revenues and market share for indie producers and declining demand for indie
cinematographers and editors.
Moreover, Amory and Selnick may have difficulty establishing the directness of any
injury to them. In Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters,451 The Supreme Court cautioned against allowing antitrust injury to be
establish by a long chain of causation:
"In this case, . . . the Union was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in
which trade was restrained. It is not clear whether the Union's interests would be
served or disserved by enhanced competition in the market."452 "[T]he chain of
causation between the Union's injury and the alleged restraint in the market for
construction subcontracts contains several somewhat vaguely defined links."453
"Partly because it is indirect, and partly because the alleged effects on the Union may
have been produced by independent factors, the Union's damages claim is also highly
speculative. There is, for example, no allegation that any collective bargaining
agreement was terminated as a result of the coercion, no allegation that the aggregate
share of the contracting market controlled by union firms has diminished, no allegation
that the number of employed union members has declined, and no allegation that the
Union's revenues in the form of dues or initiation fees have decreased. Moreover,
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656 F.3d at 122-123 [internal quotations and citations omitted].

459 U.S. 519 (1983) (reversing court of appeals and holding that union claiming a conspiracy to shift
work from union to non-union contracts could not establish antitrust injury).
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459 U.S. at 539.
459 U.S. at 540.

108

although coercion against certain firms is alleged, there is no assertion that any such
firm was prevented from doing business with any union firms or that any firm or group
of firms was subjected to a complete boycott."454
Amory and Selnick would have to establish that they lost employment opportunities
because they were forced to demand higher compensation. If other indie
cinematographers and editors remain free to work for less, that would help them
establish individual injury but would undercut their argument that competition in
general had been limited. Marshall would have to establish that he, along with other
indie producers lost business as a result of the limitations on wage competition. To do
that, he would have to marshal evidence (a) that Disney and Comcast had sufficient
market power to drive up wages in the indie producer market (b) that the increased
wages adversely affected Marshall’s ability to earn revenue, and (c) that any economic
misfortune suffered by Marshall was not due to other factors.
All of this is a very tall order, necessitating heroic econometric analysis, unlikely to be
available to any of the plausible plaintiffs.
It is likely that both the agreement between the IATSE and Amory or the agreement
between Comcast and Selnick violate U.S. antitrust law. Neither agreement falls within
the statutory or nonstatutory labor exemptions to antitrust law. Amory, Selnick and
Marshall would have a very hard time, however, establishing standing to sue IATSE,
Disney, or Comcast for antitrust violations.
If the conduct violates section 8(b)(4) or 8(e) of the NLRA, Amory, Selnick, and Marshall
can sue for damages,455 under labor law, but coverage by section 8(b)(4) prevents a
direct antitrust claim under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.456
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459 U.S. at 542.
29 U.S.C. § 187.

Compare Baker v. IBP, Inc. 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that preemption has nothing to
do with federal claims filed in federal court but that doctrines of primary jurisdiction and abstention may
require federal court to defer exercise of jurisdiction pending action before NLRB) and Marquez v. Screen
Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 56 (1998) (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over duty-of-fairrepresentation claim by actress denied a movie role because she did not pay union dues in advance;
compliance with union-security clause proviso in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) was within primary jurisdiction of
NLRB) with Smart v. Local 702, IBEW, 562 F.3d 798, 808-809 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that state antitrust
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The 8(b)(4)B)(ii) argument with respect to both Amory and Selnick is that the union is:
"forcing or requiring any person [Amory and Selnick] . . . to cease doing business with
any other person [Marshall . . . .457
The questions are (a) whether the union, is (b) "forcing or requiring", 458and (c)
whether a literal violation is an actual violation, given that the target of the subsection is
"secondary" pressure. What's the primary dispute?

VII. Hope for the future
The technology-driven revolution in the entertainment industries has enormous
potential to enrich art, broaden the entertainment choices available to everyone, and to
increase the probability that artists can earn the personal fulfillment that comes from
exposing their art to people who enjoy it. For that potential to be realized, however,
legal and political institutions must embrace certain propositions about the revolution
and its likely outcomes and be guided by certain other propositions about government
intervention.
Economies of scale yield larger and larger bottlenecks that have the power to erect
barriers to entry and are few enough in number to be organized effectively 459

claim was completely preempted because non-union contractor fired by construction project due to union
pressure had arguable claim under section 8(b)(4)).
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29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)(ii).

See Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1255-1256(3d Cir. 1991) (finding
that threat to cancel prehire agreement may constitute coercion under 8(b)(4); Sheet Metal Workers, Local
Union No. 91 v. N.L.R.B., 905 F.2d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Harry Edwards, J.) (finding coercion under
8(b)(4) from union threatening to withhold wage concessions unless employer agreed to terminate
relations with non-union firms in violation of section 8(e)); N.L.R.B. v. Local 825, A,B,C,D, Intern. Union
of Operating Engineers, 659 F.2d 379, 385 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that warning by union business agent
about non-union contractor coming on job site did not constitute “threat” under 8(b)(4)).
458

The Federal Circuit recognized the legitimacy of considering economies of scale on the procompetitive side of the balancing in rule-of-reason analysis. Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com'n,
616 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The case involved a claim of patent misuse by an importer, alleging
that horizontal agreements among patent holders to set standards violated the rule of reason. 616 F.3d at
1335. The court of appeals, aggreeing with the International Trade Commission, held that the procompetitive effect of the standards for writable CDs past muster under rule of reason analysis.See also
459
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The most promising fountains of creative innovation are too small to challenge the
barriers and too numerous to be organized
Governmental institutions are, for the most part, unlikely to fill the breach because they
have been captured by the defenders of the old, who are terrified by the new, and by
the new empires that want to protect and enhance their market dominance. Because of
this, the safest course is a presumption of legal abstention and reliance on markets to
sort out supply of and demand for new products.
So what's to be done?460
1. Enact Net Neutrality legislation and defend its principles against copyrightenforcement overreaching.
2. Do not try to break up Google, Amazon, or Netflix merely because they are big and
dominate their markets. In United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,461 the Supreme
Court recognized that technology may produce increasing economies of scale that lead
to concentration in an industry--legitimate under the antitrust laws--while also making
easier for the smaller number of competitors to engage in "parallel policies of mutual
advantage" rather than letting competition flourish.462
3. Re-educate the public, the judiciary, and the bar about copyright, trademark, and
rights of publicity to counter the propaganda of the old guard
4. Hope for more grass-roots Internet-oriented movements such as the Net Neutrality
movement and the anti-PROTECT IP SOPA movements

Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting Sherman Act
claim that standards-enforcement activity violated rule of reason; considering economies of scale).
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet at 20: Evolution of a Constitution for Cyberspace, 20 Wm. &
Mary Rts. J. 1115, 1179 (2012) (arguing that the Internet's "constitution" has been validated by the
Internet's success).
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410 U.S. 526 (1973).

410 U.S. at 550-551 (reversing judgment for defendant in Clayton Act suit to enjoin acquitioon of
competing beer producer).
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